Krulak Mendenhall Mission - Aftermath

Aftermath

One strategy that received increasing consideration in NSC meetings—as well as at the US Embassy, Saigon and in Congress—was a suspension of non-military aid to Diem. After the erroneous Voice of America broadcast on August 26, which announced an aid suspension, Lodge was given the discretion on August 29 to suspend aid if it would facilitate a coup. In the meantime, the US Senate began to pressure the administration to take action against Diem. Hilsman was lobbied by the Senate Subcommittee on the Far East. Senator Frank Church informed the administration of his intention to introduce a resolution condemning Diem's anti-Buddhist repression and calling for the termination of aid unless religious equality was instituted. This resulted in Church agreeing to temporarily delay the introduction of the bill to avoid embarrassing the administration.

While the delegation was in Vietnam, the strategy of using a selective aid suspension to pressure Diem into ending religious discrimination was actively discussed at the State Department. In a television interview on September 8, AID Director David Bell warned that Congress might cut aid to South Vietnam if Diem did not change his policies. On September 9, Kennedy backed away from Bell's comments, stating "I don't think we think that would be helpful at this time." On September 11, the day after Krulak and Mendenhall tabled their reports, Lodge reversed his position. In a long cable to Washington, he advocated the consideration of using non-military aid suspension to spark the toppling of Diem. Lodge concluded that the US could not get what it wanted from Diem, and had to force events to come to a head. After another White House meeting on the same day, Senator Church was informed that his bill was acceptable, so he introduced the legislation into the Senate.

The National Security Council re-convened on September 17 to consider two of Hilsman's proposals for dealing with Diem. The plan favored by Hilsman and his State Department colleagues was the "pressures and persuasion track". This involved an escalating series of measures at both public and private level, including selective aid suspension and pressuring Diem to remove Nhu from power. The alternative was the "reconciliation with a rehabilitated GVN track", which involved the public appearance of acquiescence to Diem's recent actions and an attempt to salvage as much as possible from the situation. Both proposals assumed that an ARVN coup was not forthcoming. The inconclusive report saw a follow-up mission sent to Vietnam, the McNamara Taylor mission, led by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor.