Kenneth Binmore - Books

Books

• (1977). Mathematical Analysis: A Straightforward Approach. New York: Cambridge University Press.
• (1980). Foundations of Analysis: Book 1: Logic, Sets and Numbers. Cambridge University Press.
• (1980). Foundations of Analysis: Book 2: Topological Ideas. Cambridge University Press.
• (1986). Economic Organizations As Games (co-edited with Partha Dasgupta). Basil Blackwell.
• (1987). The Economics of Bargaining (co-edited with Partha Dasgupta). Basil Blackwell. A collection including many of Binmore's classic early papers on Nash bargaining theory.
• (1990). Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory. Basil Blackwell. A collection which includes Binmore's seminal papers “Modeling Rational Players I and II” from Economics and Philosophy, 1987.
• (1991). Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory. D. C. Heath and Company.
• Game Theory and the Social Contract:

(1994). Volume 1: Playing Fair. Cambridge: MIT Press.

(1998). Volume 2: Just Playing. Cambridge: MIT Press.

• (2002). Calculus: Concepts and Methods (with Joan Davies). Cambridge University Press.
• (2005). Natural Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.
• (2007). Playing for Real – A Text on Game Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
• (2007). Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge. MIT Press. A collection of Binmore's influential papers on bargaining experiments, with a newly written commentary addressing the challenges to game theory posed by the behavioural school of economics.
• (2008). Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. With mini-biographies of many founders of the subject—including John Nash—this book offers a concise overview of a cutting-edge field that has seen spectacular successes in evolutionary biology and economics, and is beginning to revolutionise other disciplines from psychology to political science.
• (2009). Rational Decisions. Princeton University Press. Binmore explains the foundations of Bayesian decision theory, shows why Savage restricted the theory's application to small worlds, and argues that the Bayesian approach to knowledge is inadequate in a large world.