Japanese Occupation of Thailand - The Occupation and Alliance

The Occupation and Alliance

On December 21, 1941, a mutual offensive-defensive alliance pact between the two countries was signed The agreement, revised on December 30, gave the Japanese full access to Thai railways, roads, airfields, naval bases, warehouses, communications systems and barracks. To facilitate greater economic cooperation, Pridi was removed from the cabinet and offered a seat on the politically impotent Regency Council for the absent king, which he subsequently accepted.

Later on, as a result of Japanese pressure, the Thai government declared war on Britain and the United States on January 25, 1942. The Japanese also invited Thailand to signed the treaty alongside with the Axis Power unofficially with Manchukuo and Reorganized National Government of China on February 15, 1942.

Thailand was rewarded for Phibun's close cooperation with Japan during the early years of war with the return of further territory that had once been under Bangkok's control, namely the four northernmost Malay states. In addition, with Japan confirmed, the Thai Phayap Army was permitted to invade and annex the north-eastern Shan States of Burma. Japan meanwhile had stationed 150,000 troops on Thai soil and built the infamous Death Railway through Thailand using Asian labourers and Allied prisoners of war.

Although the majority of Thais were initially "intoxicated" with Japan's string of brilliant victories in early 1942, by the end of the year there was widespread resentment as a result of arrogant Japanese behaviour and war-induced economic problems. Even during the early stages of the war there was friction over issues such as the confiscation of Allied property and economic and monetary matters, as well as the treatment of Thailand's ethnic Chinese community.

A vicious contest for saw mills and teak logs owned by British companies erupted early on, followed by similar disputes over the control of enemy energy and shipping facilities within the country. Other problems were more severe. For a time Germany continued actively purchasing local products, but once shipping difficulties became unsolvable, Japan became Thailand's sole significant trading partner. Similarly, Thailand had to rely on the Japanese for consumer goods previously imported from Europe and the United States, which Japan was increasingly unable to provide as the war wore on. A shortage of commodities quickly developed, with inflation soaring and standards of living dropping. Worse still, the Japanese had aggressively claimed the right to import goods duty-free, significantly reducing the Thai government's revenues.

Things came to a head in December 1942 when an armed confrontation between Japanese troops and Thai villagers and police escalated into a shoot-out in Ratchaburi. Although the Ban Pong incident was promptly and peacefully resolved, it served as "a warning signal that alerted Tokyo to the seriousness of the problems in Thailand". This led to General Aketo Nakamura being sent to command the newly formed Thailand Garrison Army. Nakamura's ability to understand the Thai perspective, combined with his affable personality, significantly helped to improve Thai-Japanese relations.

This more conciliatory stance occurred at a moment when the tide began to turn against Japan, something which many within the Thai government recognised. Realising that the Allies had seized the initiative in the war, Phibun, well aware of the troublesome personal predicament his relationship with Tokyo had put him in, started distancing himself from the Japanese. In January 1943 he had two of the Phayap Army's divisional commanders arrange the return of a group of Chinese prisoners-of-war as a gesture of friendship designed to open secret negotiations with Chungking.

But the prime minister's star was waning at a much faster rate than he had thought. With the Allies intensifying their bombing raids on Bangkok, public confidence in Phibun, already tested by his idiosyncratic domestic policies, was sagging fast. His frequent absence from Bangkok led morale to plummet, while a sudden proclamation that the capital and its inhabitants be immediately moved north to malaria-infested Phetchabun was greeted with near-universal bemusement and discontent. And it wasn't only the public. The kingdom's ruling elite too was becoming increasingly weary of Phibun, whose intimidation and demotion of dissenters within the government served to further unite his opponents, who were gathering around Pridi.

Even the Japanese were becoming disaffected with Phibun. That a military scheme lay behind Phibun's attempt to relocate the seat of government certainly wasn't lost on the Japanese. Remote, with the nearest rail connection being at Phitsanulok, a half-day's drive away, Phetchabun's main asset was its suitability as a mountainous fortress; moreover, the site was located in a region where the majority of the Thai army was based.

Coinciding with the beginnings of Phibun's efforts to distance himself – through prolonged trips to the provinces – from the Japanese was the downfall of Benito Mussolini in Italy, an event which sent shock waves throughout the Thai elite, to the point that an emergency cabinet meeting was convened to discuss the European war situation. Analogies with Italy were soon being made by many: while "Badoglio" became an increasingly popular Thai political epithet, the Japanese envoy in Berlin was advised by Reichsmarschall Göring to keep a close watch on the Thai, lest they turn into an "Oriental Italy."

However, in spite of increasing domestic discontent and Japanese distrust, it would not be until the following year that Phibun's political demise would come.