Expected Counterattacks
Between February and March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first-phase operations. In planning second-phase operations, the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter-offensives could be expected starting in 1943. Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment.
As for the scale of counterattack, the operations people could make no definitive estimate, because they had no basis for forecasting. Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions. The estimates proved overly optimistic. The American counter-assault began in the latter half of 1942.
Imperial General Headquarters Intelligence Estimates of Allied Strength (Early May 1942)
| United States (Pacific Coasts) |
| Land Forces: 1,800,000 (43 fully equipped divisions) |
| Aircraft: 3,500 first line operatives |
| Forecast: Towards end of 1942, ground forces will number about 2,000,000; first line warplanes will reach about 6,000 |
|
| Alaska & Aleutians |
| Land Forces: 8,800 Army & Navy |
| Aircraft: 150 |
|
| Hawaiian area |
| Land Forces: Land Forces: 35,000 Army |
| Aircraft: 150 |
|
| Midway |
| Land Forces: 1,700 Army & Navy |
| Aircraft: 59 |
|
| West Samoa |
| Land Forces: 750 U.S.Navy |
| Aircraft: 20 |
|
| Fiji |
| Land Forces: 7,500 U.S. & British Army |
| Aircraft: 20 |
|
| New Caledonia & Loyalty |
| Land Forces: 3,000 U.S. & De Gaullist Army |
| Airplanes: 10 |
|
| Australia |
| Land Forces: 350,000 (10 Australian Divisions) |
| Aircraft: 500 |
| Forecast: U.S. Army now arriving: 1 or 2 Divisions plus New Zealand Units |
|
| New Zealand |
| Land Forces: 70,000 (3 New Zealand divisions) |
| Aircraft: 250 |
|
| British India |
| Land Forces: 5,000,000 (7 Divisions British Army,23 Divisions Indian Army) |
| Aircraft: 350 |
|
| Ceylon |
| Land Forces: 1-2 British divisions |
|
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well-which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large-scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re-activated until February 6, 1944.