Huon Peninsula Campaign - Aftermath

Aftermath

The operations undertaken by the 9th Division during the Huon Peninsula campaign were the largest by the Australian Army to that point of the war. Backed up by significant industrial resources which provided them with a significant technological edge over the Japanese, the Australian campaign destroyed what offensive capabilities the Japanese had in the region, and enabled them to gain control of vital sea lanes of communication and airfields that furthered their ability to conduct offensive operations in north-western New Guinea and New Britain. After the capture of Sio, on 21 January 1944 the 9th Division handed over to the 5th Division. The 5th Division was a Militia formation and its take over was part of the wider Australian plan to re-allocate the veteran divisions of the 2nd AIF to more intense operations elsewhere, namely the Philippines, while using the less experienced Militia formations to undertake the lower intensity work required to mop-up isolated pockets of Japanese resistance. In the event, the 9th Division was precluded from taking part in the fighting in the Philippines due to inter-Allied politics, and it was subsequently employed in Borneo in 1945. Meanwhile, one of the 5th Division's component formations, the 8th Brigade, conducted mopping up operations around Sio throughout January into February and March 1944. They also effected a link up with US forces around Saidor.

The 9th Division suffered 1,082 battle casualties during its involvement in the fighting on the Huon Peninsula. This included 283 men who were killed in action and one who was listed as "missing". These casualties were relatively light in the wider context of the division's involvement in the war as they had suffered more than twice that number during the fighting around El Alamein earlier in the war. Regardless, a number of factors combined to make the fighting on the Huon Peninsula, in the words of one participant, "harder and more nerve-racking" than that which the 9th had taken part in before. These included the harsh terrain, the closeness of the combat, and the lack of hot food, water and motor transport. Disease also proved significant and during the campaign up to 85 per cent of the division's personnel were ineffective due to illness at some stage.

Nevertheless, the most significant factor was the fighting qualities of the Japanese soldier. One Australian veteran, Sergeant Charles Lemaire, who had previously fought against the Germans at El Alamein with the 2/17th Infantry Battalion, described the Japanese as "tenacious, brave, self-sacrificing". In the minds of the Australian soldiers, the Japanese had a reputation for being tough opponents and for not taking prisoners. Despite this perception amongst the Australians, there was a sense of confidence in their technological superiority. For the Japanese soldiers, the technological edge that the Australians possessed and their relatively abundant supply of ammunition and artillery and air support was the main psychological factor that governed their perceptions of the Australians as enemy. In order to counter this, Japanese commanders exhorted their troops to draw upon "spiritual strength" to achieve victory. In the end, although many of the significant actions of the campaign were infantry engagements which occurred a long way from the Australian base areas where their technological superiority was limited, the Australians' use of combined arms tactics ultimately proved decisive. Although preliminary aerial bombardment, particularly that which was employed around Sattelberg, proved largely ineffective in terms of its physical effects, it did serve to reduce Japanese morale. Used in combination with artillery preparation, which caused significant casualties, considerable disruption was caused to Japanese lines of communications that were already stretched. Suffering from ammunition shortages that limited their fire support, the Japanese defenders were overwhelmed by Australian infantry that had a level of artillery support that was unprecedented for an Australian division in the Pacific, and who advanced in concert with tanks that they employed in a manner that exploited the element of surprise.

Japanese losses during the campaign amounted to a significantly higher total than those of the Allies, although exact numbers have not been established. About 12,500 Japanese soldiers participated in the campaign and about 5,500 are believed to have been killed. Some sources indicate a possibly higher toll. With only 4,300 Japanese reaching Sio at the end of the campaign, it is possible that the figure is closer to 7 or 8,000. A significant amount of war materiel was also lost during the campaign. Of the 26 field artillery pieces that the Japanese possessed in the region, 18 were captured by the Australians during the campaign, while 28 out of their 36 heavy machine-guns were also lost.

At the start of the campaign, the Australian Army had been the only ground force engaging in combat with the Japanese in the region. By the end, though, the involvement of US forces in the region had increased as the US Army took over responsibility for the main Allied effort from the Australians. Elsewhere, the 7th Division's advance towards the Finisterre Range saw the capture of Shaggy Ridge and a subsequent advance towards Bogadjim and then Madang, which fell in April. In July and August, US forces subsequently clashed with Japanese forces, including some of those that had escaped from the Huon Peninsula, around the Driniumor River. Meanwhile, the Australian Army's efforts in the Pacific were scaled back, and it was not be until late 1944 and early 1945, when several campaigns were launched in Bougainville, New Britain, Aitape–Wewak and Borneo, that it undertook major campaigns against the Japanese again.