HMAS Australia (D84) - Operational History - World War II - 1942

1942

On 31 January, Australia and HMNZS Leander sailed from Sydney to Wellington. In February 1942, the Australian cruiser became flagship of the newly formed Anzac Squadron. In early March, Australia was assigned to shell Gasmata in New Britain. However, on 7 March, the ships for the operation were recalled, and were used three days later to provide long-range protection for the American aircraft carriers USS Lexington and USS Yorktown while they launched an air raid in retaliation to the Japanese capture of Lae and Salamaua. After the raid, Australia and the Anzac Squadron sailed for Noumea.

On the evening of 12 March, while sailing near the Louisiade Islands, one of the ship's stokers was stabbed fourteen times, and died from peritonitis during the night. Before dying, the stoker informed the ship's surgeon that he had threatened to expose the homosexual relationship between two other stokers, which led to the attack. The two accused stokers were imprisoned, and a court-martial was held between 15 and 18 March, while the ship was anchored at Noumea. The stokers were found guilty of the first ever murder aboard an Australian warship; under British naval regulations (which the RAN was operating under), the men were to be hanged from the cruiser's yardarm. However, despite Captain Harold Farncomb's aggressive prosecution of the two men, he successfully requested that the death sentences be put off at least until the ship returned home. As the men were convicted under British military law, the matter of commuting their sentences was out of Australian hands until an appeal for clemency was made to King George VI, who downgraded the sentence to life imprisonment. This situation had arisen because the Australian government had not yet adopted the Statute of Westminster 1931, a British Act which defined the Dominions as sovereign governments capable of amending or repealing previous British legislation affecting them, while preventing the British government from legislating on the Dominions' behalf unless requested. Prompted by the murder, along with issues relating to the legal control of shipping in Australian ports, and the National Security Act, a bill ratifying the Statute was passed on 9 October and backdated to the start of the war. The sentences of the two stokers were reduced several times, and they were freed in September 1950.

On 22 April, the Anzac Squadron was reclassified as Task Force 44; Australia remained flagship. Australia returned to Sydney in late April for a week of repairs and maintenance, primarily to the outer port propeller shaft. Around this time, the Americans learned of an imminent Japanese invasion of Port Moresby, and on 1 May, Australia sailed with Hobart to rendezvous with American forces in the Coral Sea. At 07:00 on 7 May, Rear Admiral John Gregory Crace, who was embarked aboard Australia as commander of Task Force 44, was ordered to take his ships (Australia, the cruisers Hobart and USS Chicago, and the destroyers USS Perkins, USS Walke and USS Farragut) to the Jomard Passage, and engage any Japanese ships found en route to Port Moresby, while several US carrier groups engaged a Japanese force headed for the Solomon Islands. The ships reached their patrol area around 14:00, fired on a group of eleven unidentified aircraft at maximum range with no damage dealt at 14:27, and were attacked themselves by twelve Japanese twin-engine torpedo bombers at 15:06. Australia and Chicago were able to manoeuvre out of the torpedoes' paths, and at least five aircraft were destroyed. At 15:16, nineteen Japanese heavy bombers dropped their payload the Allied ships. Although accurate (Australia was surrounded by the spread), none of the ships were hit directly, and the only casualties (aboard Chicago) were from shrapnel. A few minutes later, the ships were attacked by another three heavy bombers, flying at a higher altitude to the first group; the bombing was much less accurate. It was later learned that the three aircraft belonged to the United States Army Air Force (USAAF). Although USN Vice Admiral Herbert F. Leary made plans to train aircrews in naval vessel recognition in response, USAAF General George Brett refused to implement them or acknowledge that the friendly fire incident had happened. With no new orders, Crace decided to relocate his ships during the night to a point 220 nautical miles (410 km; 250 mi) from Port Moresby, to better intercept a Japanese invasion force if it came through either the Jomard Passage or the China Strait. Instructions from the American commander of the operation were still not forthcoming, and Crace was forced to rely on intercepted radio messages to track the progress of the main battle. Australia and the rest of the task force remained in their assigned area until 01:00 on 10 May, when Crace ordered them to withdraw south to Cid Harbour on Whitsunday Island; the lack of reports and intelligence concerning either the Americans or Japanese led him to conclude that both forces had withdrawn, and there was no immediate threat to Port Moresby.

On 13 June, Crace was replaced by Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley as commander of Task Force 44 and the flag officer embarked aboard Australia. A month later, on 14 July, Australia led Task Force 44 from Brisbane to rendezvous in Wellington with the amphibious assault force for the landings at Guadalcanal and the surrounding islands. The force left New Zealand for Fiji on 22 July, and conducted rehearsal landings at Koro Island from 28 to 31 July. They met the rest of the attack force (three carrier groups and more transports) south of Fiji on the evening of 1 August, then headed for the Solomon Islands. The various elements began to head for their positions on 6 August, with Australia leading Squadron X (with four other cruisers, nine destroyers, nine transports, and six store ships) towards the main landing site, on the north side of Guadalcanal. During the early morning of 7 August, Squadron X transited the channel between Guadalcanal and Savo Island, and reached the assault point off Lunga Point at 06:47. While moving into position, Australia and the other warships fired on shore targets sporadically, then commenced a coordinated bombardment before the first wave of landing craft hit the beach unopposed just after 08:00. Despite the efforts of the carrier air groups and interdiction attacks on Japanese air bases, the first of several retaliatory air attacks against Squadron X occurred at 13:23; each was driven off by the squadron's massed anti-aircraft fire, with no damage to Australia. Anticipating a naval attack to occur during the night, Crutchley split his forces around Savo Island, with Australia leading Canberra, USS Chicago, and two destroyers on patrol of the southern waters, a second group of three heavy cruisers and two destroyers to patrol the northern passage, while the rest of the ships protected the transports or served as picket ships. Nothing occurred during the night of 7–8 August, and the same arrangement was assumed at 18:30 for the night of 8–9 August. At 20:45, Crutchley was recalled to meet urgently with US Admiral Richmond K. Turner, overall commander of the amphibious landings, aboard the transport USS McCawley to discuss the proposed withdrawal of the carrier groups, and Australia left the patrol group. The meeting concluded at 01:15 on 9 August, and instead of returning to the southern patrol, Crutchley ordered Australia to patrol around the transports. Just before 02:00, the southern patrol force was attacked by a six-ship Japanese task force, and Canberra was irreparably damaged. Three US cruisers were lost in the subsequent attack on the northern patrol force.

Once the transports completed unloading, the naval force withdrew over the course of 9 August; Australia reached Noumea on 13 August. The ships of Task Force 44 were replenished at Noumea, then sailed to rejoin the three carrier groups on 19 August, in response to intelligence that a large Japanese fleet was sailing to the Solomon Islands. After arrival on 21 August, Crutchley and Australia were placed in command of the carriers' combined surface defence group, including several cruisers and the battleship USS North Carolina. Air attacks between the Allied and Japanese forces occurred during 24–25 August; the Japanese fleet was driven off without Australia or the other warships having to engage directly. On 31 August, Task Force 44 was detached from the carrier groups and sailed for Brisbane, arriving on 3 September. Four days later, Australia sailed with the task force for Milne Bay, where Allied ships and shore positions had been attacked several times by Japanese warships. Task Force 44 did not make contact with any enemy vessels. After this, the ships were assigned to patrol the Coral Sea.

Read more about this topic:  HMAS Australia (D84), Operational History, World War II