Giovanni Gentile - Philosophy

Philosophy

Benedetto Croce wrote that Gentile "...holds the honor of having been the most rigorous neo–Hegelian in the entire history of Western philosophy and the dishonor of having been the official philosopher of Fascism in Italy." His philosophical basis for fascism was rooted in his understanding of ontology and epistemology, in which he found vindication for the rejection of individualism, acceptance of collectivism, with the state as the ultimate location of authority and loyalty to which the individual found in the conception of individuality no meaning outside of the state (which in turn justified totalitarianism).

The conceptual relationship between Gentile's Actual Idealism and his fascism is not evident. The supposed relationship does not appear to be one of logical deducibility. Actual Idealism does not entail a fascist ideology in any rigorous sense. Gentile, who enjoyed fruitful intellectual relations with Croce from 1899 and particularly during their joint editorship of La Critica, 1903–22, broke philosophically and politically from Croce in the early 1920s. Croce assesses the philosophical disagreement in Una discussione tra filosofi amici in Conversazioni Critiche, II.

Ultimately, Gentile foresaw a social order wherein opposites of all kinds weren't to be considered as existing independently from each other; that 'publicness' and 'privateness' as broad interpretations were currently false as imposed by all former kinds of Government, including capitalism and communism; and that only the reciprocal totalitarian state of Corporative Syndicalism, a fascist state, could defeat these problems which are made from reifying as an external reality that which is in fact, to Gentile, only a thinking reality. Whereas it was common in the philosophy of the time to see the conditional subject as abstract and the object as concrete, Gentile postulated the opposite, that the subject is the concrete and the object is an abstraction (or rather, that what was conventionally dubbed "subject" is in fact only conditional object, and that the true subject is the 'act of' being or essence of the object).

Gentile was a notable philosophical theorist of his time throughout Europe, since having developed his 'Actual Idealism' system of Idealism, sometimes called 'Actualism.' It was especially in which his ideas put subject to the position of a transcending truth above positivism that garnered attention; by way that all senses about the world only take the form of ideas within one's mind in any real sense; to Gentile even the analogy between the function & location of the physical brain with the functions of the physical body were a consistent creation of the mind (and not brain; which was a creation of the mind and not the other way around). An example of Actual Idealism in Theology is the idea that although man may have invented the concept of God, it does not make God any less real in any sense possible as far as it is not presupposed to exist as abstraction and except in case qualities about what existence actually entails (i.e. being invented apart from the thinking making it) are presupposed. Benedetto Croce objected that Gentile's "pure act" is nothing other than Schopenhauer's will.

Therefore Gentile proposed a form of what he called 'absolute Immanentism' in which the divine was the present conception of reality in the totality of one's individual thinking as an evolving, growing and dynamic process. Many times accused of solipsism, Gentile maintained his philosophy to be a Humanism that sensed the possibility of nothing beyond what was colligate in perception; the self's human thinking, in order to communicate as immanence is to be human like oneself, made a cohesive empathy of the self-same, without an external division, and therefore not modeled as objects to one's own thinking. Whereas solipsism would feel trapped in realization of its solitude, Actualism rejects such a privation and is an expression of the only freedom which is possible within objective contingencies, where the transcendental self does not even exist as an object, and the dialectical co-substantiation of others necessary to understand the empirical self are felt as true others when found to be the unrelativistic subjectivity of that whole self and essentially unified with the spirit of such higher self in actu, where others can be truly known, rather than thought as windowless monads.

Gentile's immanentist philosophy was divergent from others in that while he put the center of existence and all spirituality in the individual, he perceived the consequence of this to mean complete selfless immersion and relegation to the social plane in action as being the truest vanguard of the will of an individual so understood, when rightly and purely expressed. This is because to Gentile social reality was not exterior to the individual, but was a qualified extension of the individual by the fact that it was the individual who recognized social reality and all its implications and qualifications through no means beyond the mind of himself. Though he may imagine he does so through his senses, which are again only external in so far as the mind internally apprehends them to be. This act constituting the full extent of what represents external character, continues to be for Gentile a product solely within the apprehension that transcends exterior being. Doing so by virtue that such immanent apprehension is what exclusively must be referred to when maintaining the basis of what seems external to the individual.

Gentile maintained the need for an intelligent opposition to the intellectualizing of systems into being, divorced from practice, which he would classify 'abstract' and for that reason unwieldy if not unworkable. Though this stand is cited by his terminology as "anti-intellectualism" he attributes to it still the factor of intelligence. Meaning 'intelligence' is as it penetrates, and not as it is object, i.e. not as it is when in the "intellectual" tense of the word. In the common meaning of this term outside of Gentiles highly analytic interpretation of it to his philosophy, Gentiles philosophy in fact contains all of the criteria in regard to comporting a favorable position toward having "intellectual" pursuits.

Gentile took the stand against psychology and psycho-analysis that one cannot abstract (i.e. make object out of) the source that creates its own surrounding reality, as one does by his own philosophy, and that any empirical observations of behavioral anthropology appear true because empiricalism always adheres to its own laws, being a closed system it is true within its own considered vacuum. Rather than look to the external for the source of one's mentality, Gentile held that any colourations on what the external first manifests as are initially created within the self, and therefore the external is a product of one's psychology and not the other way around.

Gentile's theory may be considered an extreme form of Occam's Razor, though it can appear to common sense to defy Occam's Razor outright by the complex thinking involved to relate with his theory. Gentile however deduced that common sense in considering material reality was to him not philosophical because it was not self-critical of its sensory presuppositions. To Gentile, making a thought category of his theory itself defied it by turning it into object, as any such idea of the philosophy that was not kept in subject or truly 'actual' could not be Actual Idealism.

One of his most important works is Genesi e Struttura della Società in which he argues that the individual is an abstraction originating from analysis of society. One of the consequences he draws is that the state and the individual are one and the same and that their division is an example of formal abstraction. The work was written after Mussolini had been deposed by the Fascist Grand Council but before the proclamation of the armistice between Italy and the Allies on September 8, 1943 and the Republic of Salò on September 14, 1943.