Relation To Bayesian Inference
Another expression of the generic views principal is that the inference of distal structure should be such that the inference would remain substantially the same if the "position" of the observer were moderately altered (perturned). If the inference made would have been qualitatively or categorically different under a perturbation of the observer, then the inference does not satisfy the generic views assumption, and should be rejected. (The question of what constitutes a qualitative or categorical difference is an interesting point of detail.) On this view, it can be argued that the principal of generic views is nothing more than an inference based on the maximum posterior probability (MAP) which accounts for aspects of observation. Thus, we infer the distal phenomenon which possess the highest probability of having generated the observations in question, and this probability incorporates (in addition to relevant priors) both the likelihood of the distal phenomenon generating certain observable signals, and the likelihood of the observer transducing those signals in a manner consistent with the observations. On such an analysis (and with various assumptions invoked), one can obtain a behavior approximating the generic views principal.
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