Fuzzy Concept - Psychology

Psychology

The origin of fuzzy concepts is partly due to the fact that the human brain does not operate like a computer.

• While computers use strict binary logic gates, the brain does not; i.e., it is capable of making all kinds of neural associations according to all kinds of ordering principles (or fairly chaotically) in associative patterns which are not logical but nevertheless meaningful. For example, a work of art can be meaningful without being logical.
• Something can be meaningful although we cannot name it, or we might only be able to name it and nothing else.
• The human brain can also interpret the same phenomenon in several different but interacting frames of reference, at the same time, or in quick succession, without there necessarily being an explicit logical connection between the frames.

In part, fuzzy concepts arise also because learning or the growth of understanding involves a transition from a vague awareness, which cannot orient behaviour greatly, to clearer insight, which can orient behaviour. For example, the Dutch theologian Kees de Groot explores the imprecise notion that psychotherapy is like an "implicit religion", defined as a "fuzzy concept" (it all depends on what one means by "psychotherapy" and "religion").

Some logicians argue that fuzzy concepts are a necessary consequence of the reality that any kind of distinction we might like to draw has limits of application. As a certain level of generality, a distinction works fine. But if we pursued its application in a very exact and rigorous manner, or overextend its application, it appears that the distinction simply does not apply in some areas or contexts, or that we cannot fully specify how it should be drawn. An analogy might be that zooming a telescope, camera, or microscope in and out reveals that a pattern which is sharply focused at a certain distance disappears at another distance (or becomes blurry).

In psychophysics it has been discovered that the perceptual distinctions we draw in the mind are often more sharply defined than they are in the real world. Thus, the brain actually tends to "sharpen up" our perceptions of differences in the external world. Between black and white, we are able to detect only a limited number of shades of gray, or colour gradations. If there are more gradations and transitions in reality than our conceptual distinctions can capture, then it could be argued, that how those distinctions will actually apply, must necessarily become vaguer at some point. If, for example, one wants to count and quantify distinct objects using numbers, one needs to be able to distinguish between those separate objects, but if this is difficult or impossible, then, although this may not invalidate a quantitative procedure as such, quantification is not really possible in practice; at best, we may be able to assume or infer indirectly a certain distribution of quantities.

Finally, in interacting with the external world, the human mind may often encounter new, or partly new phenomena or relationships which cannot (yet) be sharply defined given the background knowledge available, and by known distinctions, associations or generalizations.

"Crisis management plans cannot be put 'on the fly' after the crisis occurs. At the outset, information is often vague, even contradictory. Events move so quickly that decision makers experience a sense of loss of control. Often denial sets in, and managers unintentionally cut off information flow about the situation" - L. Paul Bremer, "Corporate governance and crisis management", in: Directors & Boards, Winter 2002

It also can be argued that fuzzy concepts are generated by a certain sort of lifestyle or way of working which evades definite distinctions, makes them impossible or inoperable, or which is in some way chaotic. To obtain concepts which are not fuzzy, it must be possible to test out their application in some way. But in the absence of any relevant clear distinctions, or when everything is "in a state of flux" or in transition, it may not be possible to do so, so that the amount of fuzziness increases.