Urban Intelligence Issues
Marighella speaks of the urban environment as being as or more concealing than the jungle. Walls, roofs, and other structural features interrupt line-of-sight (LOS) and make overhead imagery of less value in urban areas than in others. Such barriers preclude penetration by many sensors. There may be a limited capability provided by advanced thermal sensors, and, if available, penetrating radar, typically from airborne or spaceborne senseors that are not readily available.
What is in the open or under visible camouflage nets elsewhere is completely hidden within structures during urban contingencies (i.e., defeating conventional imagery intelligence IMINT) Further, movement of units is less frequently evident. Well-trained organizations minimize exterior activities; their soldiers remain within buildings to the maximum extent possible to reduce detection. Vehicles leave few signs of their passage on asphalt and concrete, unlike in other areas where their tracks can be seen in dirt or compressed foliage. The same LOS obstacles that interfere with friendly force communications block signal-collection efforts. The city foe will in some in stances employ local telephone systems, cellular networks, or other communications systems for which friendly force military SIGINT capabilities were not designed. Such challenges mean that intelligence analysis during urban contingencies relies more on human intelligence (HUMINT) than is the norm.
Combat service support (CSS) units are among the most dispersed and omnipresent in any area of operations, their soldiers are potentially valuable HUMINT collectors. Guards assigned to specific posts will quickly become very familiar with the area around their posts and the routines associated with that terrain. CSS drivers, men and women manning water purification sites, and others with frequent noncombatant contact should all receive training as intelligence collectors. They need to know their intelligence reporting responsibilities and have, consistent with security, a good idea of their command's intelligence requirements. These may be new ideas for even the combat service support troops of major powers, but it may be essential to teach the HN's personnel as well. Such training will consume resources, but is necessary, as is training CSS headquarters personnel when to pass information to the intelligence staff.
Reports will have to be monitored, compiled, consolidated, and disseminated to not only intelligence nodes but also operational units with an immediate need to see specific items. The inordinate reliance on HUMINT magnifies the role of the CSS soldier as intelligence collector during urban operations. Neither the benefits nor the costs have heretofore been fully recognized
Read more about this topic: Foreign Internal Defense, Direct Military Support Not Involving Combat Operations, Intelligence
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