Distant Early Warning Line - Perception of The DEW Line

Perception of The DEW Line

From the beginning of the development of the DEW Line idea, Canadian concerns over political perception grew enormously. Noted Canadian Arctic historian P. Whitney Lackenbauer argues that the Canadian Government saw little intrinsic value in the Arctic, but due to fear of Americanization and American penetration into the Canadian Arctic, brought significant changes and a more militaristic role to the north. This shift into a more military role began with a transition of authority, shifting responsibility of Arctic defense in Canada from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to the Canadian Forces. This "active defense" had three key elements: minimizing the extent of the American presence in the Canadian Arctic; Canadian government input into the management of the DEW Line; and full Canadian participation in Arctic defense.

Funding problems for the DEW Line also played a role in perception of the project. American investment in building and operating the DEW Line system declined as the ICBM threat refocused priorities, but Canada did not fill the void with commensurate additional funding. In 1968 a Canadian Department of National Defence Paper (November 27, 1968) stated no further funding for research on the DEW Line or air space defense would be allocated due in part to lack of commercial activity The Canadian Government also limit U.S. air activity, base activity, soldier numbers, and contractor numbers; and the overall operation would be considered and called in all formalities a "joint operation".