David Miller (political Theorist) - Criticisms

Criticisms

Miller's work has been subject to numerous criticisms and replies, for instance a special issue of the journal Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy on 'Nationalism and Global Justice - David Miller and His Critics' (Vol. 11, no. 4).

Miller's arguments lead to tricky situations if more than one relationship could be said to exist (for example, two family members who also work together). He doesn't give any 'lexical ordering' to his proposals, but does work through a wide range of scenarios arguing that in each situation, a 'just' understanding of the relationship can trump and maintain a wider social justice.

In the context of citizenship and state organisation, his proposal of civil, political and social equality leads to a strong redistributive state with a 'universal' welfare system.

Critiques of Miller point out that he leaves the details, and the situations where it is most important to hold some notion of social justice to be able to argue the case, too vague. It isn't good enough to say 'it depends' if one is trying to argue a philosophical case.

His reliance on the current 'conventional wisdom' leaves him open to criticism. We might all be wrong. Collecting evidence on people's deep held but rarely scrutinised beliefs about justice is notoriously difficult and unreliable. His argument for multiple rationales for justice comes in part from his belief in cultural pluralism (there are no universally shared beliefs) but theorists such as Franz Oppenheimer dispute this.

A feminist perspective might criticise his separation of spheres of justice. For people who are not engaged in one sphere, they can never receive their 'just' distribution in reference to their needs or deserts. For example, a person with no family or close friends may not belong to any 'solidaristic community' willing to distribute to compensate for their 'needs' beyond those which their position as a citizen will confer. A person who has never and will never work (home-makers, severely disabled people) will never receive 'dues' for the labour or activity which they do engage with.

In practical terms, he comes under fire for defending desert as a principle of social justice. A deterministic view of the world leads to the conclusion that we are not responsible for our skills, talents or abilities (including our ability to work to improve any natural talents) therefore it is unjust to be rewarded for them. This is argued by Rawls. Miller proposes that desert can be allocated through a strictly controlled market (to limit too much inequality). But others say that the objects or talents that the 'market' (that is, society) put economic value upon is not a just way to determine what is deserving.

Miller's support for liberal forms of nationalism has been criticised by theorists such as Iris Marion Young, who stresses the need to develop forms of solidarity that extend beyond the state. It can be argued that Miller's assertion that we have greater ethical obligations to our co-nationals than to nationals of other states relies on an assumption that all states are equally well-placed to provide for their citizens' needs, and defend their rights. Critics point out that this does not correspond to empirical reality. Young gives the example of natural resources, which are unequally distributed between states. She argues that their placement is morally arbitrary.