Constructive Vote of No Confidence - Germany

Germany

While Carlo Schmid is generally considered to be the main contributor to this constitutional innovation, the concept dates actually from the late 1920s, responding to deficiencies of the Weimar Constitution. A first precursor was introduced in the Free State of Prussia in 1932.

Governments in the 1919 Weimar Republic were usually very unstable. One factor was that a Chancellor (or Reichskanzler as he was then called) would frequently be voted out of office without his successor having sufficient backing in parliament. This led to quick succession of many Chancellors in office and finally to the imposition of cabinets that were dependent on the confidence of the President, Paul von Hindenburg. This instability was helped by and seen as contributing to the rise of the Nazi Party under Adolf Hitler.

To overcome this problem, two provisions were included in the 1949 German constitution, the Grundgesetz (Basic Law). It is provided that the Bundeskanzler may be removed from office by majority vote of the Bundestag (parliament) only if a prospective successor also has the support of a majority. The relevant provisions are as follows:

Article 67. (1) The Bundestag can express its lack of confidence in the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor with the majority of its members and by requesting the Federal President to dismiss the Federal Chancellor. The Federal President must comply with the request and appoint the person elected.

(2) Forty-eight hours must elapse between the motion and the election.

Article 68. (1) If a motion of a Federal Chancellor for a vote of confidence is not assented to by the majority of the members of the Bundestag, the Federal President may, upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor, dissolve the Bundestag within twenty-one days. The right to dissolve shall lapse as soon as the Bundestag with the majority of its members elects another Federal Chancellor.

(2) Forty-eight hours must elapse between the motion and the vote thereon.

As a result, the failure of a motion of confidence does not automatically force either the resignation of the cabinet or a new election. Rather, the cabinet may continue as a minority government if the opposition is unable to agree to a successor via a constructive vote of no confidence.

Also, the Federal President may dissolve the legislature only after the failure of a motion of confidence, and the legislature may not dissolve itself either. This provision is intended to limit the power of the President, which was also considered a weakness in the Weimar Republic. One consequence of this is that in contrast to many other parliamentary democracies, the German Chancellor does not petition the head of state to dissolve the legislature. Rather, in the past, the Federal Chancellor has proposed a motion of confidence that he intentionally loses. However, this practice has been restricted by the Federal Constitutional Court since the election of Helmut Kohl in 1982.