Commonwealth V. Hunt - Trial and Appeal - Trial Court Decision

Trial Court Decision

At trial, the prosecution, lead by Parker, focused on proving that the Society was coercive. Wait, Horne’s master, testified that “he did not feel at liberty to employ any but society men,” because he “would not wish to lose five or six good workmen for the sake of one.” However, he also testified that he had not been oppressed and that he had benefited from the Society’s existence. Parker tried to call Horne himself to testify, but the defense successfully prevented his testimony from being heard on the ground that he was an atheist. The prosecution, however, was able to directly ask several masters, over the defense’s objection, whether the Society was coercive. Some said yes.

The Society hired Robert Rantoul, Jr., a strong Democrat and a political opponent to the conservative Whig party, to represent them. Rantoul’s defense focused on establishing the benefits of the Society. He called witnesses who testified that the wages stipulated by the Society were reasonable and that non-members were also able to attain wages at the same rate. Non-workers were only prevented from working at a handful of the larger shops. Rantoul also called representatives from other professional organizations, such as the Boston Medical Association and the Boston Bar, of which the Judge, the District Attorney, the Attorney General, Daniel Webster and the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, Lemuel Shaw, were all members. Rantoul also solicited testimony that the Bar Association fixed minimum fees for which its members could receive and forbade members from advising or consulting any non-member attorney. He hoped to show the jury that professional organizations such the Bootmaker’s Society were not uncommon in Boston.

Rantoul also argued to the jury that that there was no law in Massachusetts against a conspiracy in restraint of trade (At that time in Massachusetts, juries still served as triers of both law and fact). Rantoul told the jury, “We have not adopted the whole mass of the common law of England. Law against acts done in restraint of trade belong to that portion of the law of England which we have not adopted." Rantoul argued that, as the conspiracy itself was not unlawful, the question was whether the defendants had injured anyone through an illegal act. He stated, “We contend they have a perfect right to form a society for their mutual interest and improvement. To substantiate these charges they must prove actual force, fraud and nuisance.” Rantoul’s emphasis on the requirement of injury recalled Gibson’s opinion in Carlisle twenty years earlier, and drew from the entire line of cases opposing Pullis and Fisher.

Rantoul’s efforts, however, were greatly undermined by Judge Thacher’s emotional charge to the jury. Thacher told the jury that if societies such as the Bootmaker’s Society were justified by the law and became common, it would “render property insecure, and make it the spoil of the multitude, would annihilate property, and involve society in a common ruin.” Thacher also specifically rebutted Rantoul with regard to the status of the common law, stating that “conspiracy is an offence at common law, as adopted in Massachusetts, and by this decision and that of this court you must abide.” Levy wrote that Thacher’s charge, “practically directed a verdict of guilty.”

After Thacher gave his instructions the jury returned a conviction against all seven defendants. Rantoul appealed the case to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.