British Military Intervention in The Sierra Leone Civil War - Build-up To The Intervention

Build-up To The Intervention

In accordance with the Lomé Agreement, UNAMSIL set up disarmament camps throughout Sierra Leone, which were intended to disarm the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), the RUF, and the militia groups which operated in the country. The SLA and some militia groups began to enter the camps but the RUF did not. In April 2000, 10 members of the RUF entered a UNAMSIL camp without the knowledge of the RUF's leadership. Upon locating its fighter, the RUF demanded their return. The military observers refused, and the RUF responded by besieging the camp. They proceeded to attack other UNAMSIL bases in the area they controlled and taking UN personnel prisoner, and then began to advance into areas previously controlled by the Sierra Leone government. On 3 May, the RUF took control of the town of Kambia. The SLA had been confined to barracks and had handed over most of its weapons in accordance with the Lomé Agreement, which led foreign diplomats in the country to estimate that the RUF could be in Freetown within a week.

The United Nations issued a statement condemning the violence, after which Secretary-General Kofi Annan told the British ambassador that the UN expected the United Kingdom, as the former colonial power, to intervene in Sierra Leone directly, rather than relying on the UN.

By 5 May, the British government was exploring its options for a military deployment – the United Kingdom had a greater level of political involvement in Sierra Leone than in any other African country and, with the country's stability deteriorating, it was reluctant to see that investment wasted. In addition, an estimated 1,000 entitled personnel were in Sierra Leone, and the government feared for their safety. The British Armed Forces were not as widely deployed in 2000 as they were to be later in the decade. The British Army had two brigades serving with NATO in the Balkans, and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) had ongoing commitments to Cyprus and the Falkland Islands, but the armed forces – particularly units threatened by proposed cuts to the defence budget – were keen to participate in an operation, so senior officers advised the government that an operation in Sierra Leone was feasible. Over the following days, there was debate within the British government as to what the aims of a military deployment to Sierra Leone would be. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) advocated a full-scale intervention to assist UNAMSIL, arguing that a non-combatant evacuation operation would not be sufficient and would undermine UNAMSIL, but the MoD believed that the armed forces would be unable to sustain a larger-scale operation in addition to their existing commitments.

The British government's emergency committee, COBRA, was convened and presented with three options for an evacuation of entitled persons – deployment of aircraft and special forces to conduct an evacuation via Lungi airport, deployment of regular ground forces for a similar operation, or re-routing the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) to a position off the coast of Sierra Leone. COBRA concluded that it lacked sufficient information to recommend one of the three options and instructed the MoD to continue to develop them, while also recommending that an "operational reconnaissance and liaison team" (ORLT) be sent to Sierra Leone in order to assess the situation in the country and advise on how the military could be useful. Prime Minister Tony Blair approved the ORLT, and – commanded by Brigadier David Richards – and, accompanied by a close protection force, it left the same day, arriving in Freetown in the early hours of 6 May.

The readiness of several other assets was heightened on 5 May. Two Royal Navy vessels – aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious and frigate HMS Argyll were ordered to sail to the area, as was the ARG (which had been on exercise in southern France); the standby special forces squadron and 1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment (1 PARA) were both ordered to prepare for a potential operation in Sierra Leone; and several Royal Air Force (RAF) transport aircraft were taken off other duties and ordered to be prepared to airlift special forces and/or 1 PARA to Lungi airport. At the same time, four RAF CH-47 Chinooks were ordered to deploy to Sierra Leone – two from the Balkans and two from their base in the United Kingdom. At the time the RAF lacked aircraft large enough to transport Chinooks and so the helicopter crews were forced to fly themselves to Freetown in a 3,000 miles (4,800 km) flight that became the longest self-deployment of helicopters in British history.