Bibliography of Reconstruction - Compromise of 1877 and End of Reconstruction

Compromise of 1877 and End of Reconstruction

• Benedict, Michael L. "Southern Democrats in the Crisis of 1876–1877: A Reconsideration of Reunion and Reaction". Journal of Southern History 46 (November 1980): 489–524; Says the Compromise was reached before the Wormley hotel meetings discussed by Woodward (1951); in JSTOR
• DeSantis, Vincent P. "Rutherford B. Hayes and the Removal of the Troops and the End of Reconstruction". In Region, Race and Reconstruction Ed. by Morgan Kousser and James McPherson. (1982). 417-50. Provides a more complex account of Hayes's decision.
• De Santis, Vincent P. "President Hayes's Southern Policy." Journal of Southern History 1955 21(4): 476–494. in Jstor
• Hoogenboom, Ari. The Presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes (1988)
• King, Ronald F. "A Most Corrupt Election: Louisiana in 1876." Studies in American Political Development 2001 15(2): 123–137. Issn: 0898-588x Fulltext: online from Cambridge Journals
• Peskin, Allan. "Was There a Compromise of 1877?" Journal of American History (1973) v 60#1, pp 63–75 in JSTOR; Admits that Woodward's interpretation is almost universally accepted but since not all terms were met it should not be called a compromise.
• McPherson, James M. "Coercion or Conciliation? Abolitionists Debate President Hayes's Southern Policy." New England Quarterly 1966 39(4): 474–497. Issn: 0028-4866 Fulltext: in Jstor. Argues Hayes had been convinced since 1875 that Grant's approach toward the South had to be abandoned and hoped to substitute conciliation for coercion, believing that the good will of Southern upper class whites would provide better protection for Blacks than the hated Federal troops. A majority of abolitionists disagreed, but about 36% of abolitionists supported Hayes, thereby causing a decided division in their ranks.
• Polakoff, Keith Ian. The Politics of Inertia: The Election of 1876 and the End of Reconstruction. Louisiana State University Press, 1973. Argues the Compromise reflected decentralized parties and weak national leaders
• Simpson, Brooks D. "Ulysses S. Grant and the Electoral Crisis of 1876–1877." Hayes Historical Journal 1992 11(2): 5–22. Issn: 0364-5924. The compromise kept the White House in GOP control. It ended the promise of Reconstruction, as many scholars have argued, and more importantly it maintained the still fragile Union. Historians mostly ignored Grant's decisive role in engineering the compromise. He was not a lame duck but took a deep interest in the behind-the-scenes negotiations. His apparent inaction stemmed from the very real threat of violence that could once again divide the nation, and ultimately his quiet diplomacy was key to the final peaceful outcome.
• Vazzano, Frank P. "President Hayes, Congress and the Appropriations Riders Vetoes." Congress & the Presidency 1993 20(1): 25–37. Issn: 0734-3469 Fulltext: at Ebsco. Shows Hayes vetoed Democratic bills intended to remove the last remaining Reconstruction-era restraints: federal marshals at Southern polling places and loyalty oaths for jurors.
• Woodward, C. Vann Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (1951), emphasizes the role of railroads.
• Woodward, C. Vann "Yes, There Was a Compromise of 1877" Journal of American History (1973) v 60#2, pp 215–23. in JSTOR. Rebuts Peskin; the main terms were indeed met.