Battle of The Yalu River (1894) - Background

Background

Even before the Battle of Pyongyang, Chinese Viceroy Li Hongzhang ordered reinforcements from the Beiyang Army to bolster the increasingly precarious Chinese position in Korea. As the roads were considered impassable, the only practical way to move a large number of men and equipment was by sea. However, he was constrained by orders from Beijing not to allow his ships to cross the line of the Yalu River, as the imperial authorities were reluctant to risk China's most modern western vessels in combat.

The Chinese fleet was bigger and armed with bigger guns. The Japanese fleet was much faster. As a result the Japanese would have an advantage in open water. So as the Japanese fleet closed in, Li recommended the convoys be stopped, and that the Beiyang fleet be kept within its naval stronghold in Lushunkou (Port Arthur). This narrow stripe of water should minimize the Japanese fleet's speed advantage. This along with the stronghold's coastal defense should defeat the Japanese fleet. However Emperor Guangxu is enraged that the Japanese fleet is near Chinese territory, so he insist that the convoys be continued and the Japanese fleet be pushed back.

The Beiyang fleet had completed escorting a convoy to the mouth of the Yalu River, and was returning to its base at Lushunkou (Port Arthur) when it was engaged by the Japanese navy.

On paper, the Beiyang Fleet had the superior ships, included two pre-dreadnought battleships, Dingyuan and Zhenyuan for which the Japanese had no counterparts. The Beiyang Fleet could also call on the assistance of numerous military advisors, including Prussian Army Major Constatin von Hanneken, recently from Korea, was appointed as the naval adviser to Admiral Ding Ruchang. W. F. Tyler, a sub-lieutenant in the Royal Navy Reserve and an Imperial Maritime Customs officer was appointed as von Hanneken's assistant. Philo McGiffen, formerly an ensign in the US Navy and an instructor at the Chinese Weihaiwei naval academy was appointed to Jingyuen as an adviser or co-commander.

However, the Chinese had not engaged in gunnery practice for months beforehand, and the Chinese gun crews were unprepared for the stress of gunnery under fire. The lack of training was a direct result of a serious lack of ammunition. Corruption seems also to have played a major role; many Chinese shells appear to have been filled with cement or porcelain, or were the wrong caliber and could not be fired. Philo McGiffin noted that many of the gunpowder charges were 'thirteen years old and condemned.' What little ammo was available the commanders tried to preserve for a real battle. Live ammunition training was rarely carried out.

Li wanted to delay the battle against the Japanese fleet, so they would have more time to equip the ships with enough ammunition. However the royal court called him a coward and his recommendation was turned down.