Battle of The Imjin River - Background

Background

The battle took place during the Chinese Spring Offensive, an offensive aimed at recapturing Seoul. The Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese and North Korean Communist Forces in the Field, General Peng Dehuai, issued an operational directive that summarizes the initial objectives of the offensive as follows:

“First of all, we will mass our forces to wipe out the 6th Division of the Puppet Army, the British 27th Brigade, the American 3rd Division, the Turkish Brigade, the British 29th Brigade and the 1st Division of the Puppet Army .”

In order to achieve the objective of recapturing Seoul, it was necessary to overcome the resistance by those UN forces mentioned in the operational directive. Peng planned to converge on Seoul with III, IX and XIX Army Groups which had a combined strength of around 270,000 men. XIX Army Group was positioned on the left flank of the UN line. Its 63rd and 64th Army were to cross the Imjin on a twelve mile front and then to attack southeast towards Seoul. Three divisions of 63rd Army, the 187th, 188th and 189th Division, were involved in the attack on the British 29th Infantry Brigade’s positions on the Imjin river from 22–25 April 1951. 25 miles further to the east, other Chinese forces were involved in an attack on UN forces which included 27th British Commonwealth Brigade. That battle became known as the Battle of Kapyong.

At the time of the Chinese attack, 29th Infantry Brigade (commanded by Brigadier Tom Brodie) consisted of the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment (also called "The Glosters"), under Lieutenant-Colonel James P. Carne, the 1st Battalion, The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (RNF) under Lieutenant-Colonel Kingsley Foster, the 1st Battalion, The Royal Ulster Rifles (RUR) under the temporary command of Major Gerald Rickord and the Belgian battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Crahay (700 men) to which Luxembourg's contribution to the UN forces was attached. The British soldiers were a mixture of regular soldiers, reservists and conscripted National servicemen. Their supporting units included 45 Field Regiment Royal Artillery, tanks from the 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars and 170th Independent Mortar Battery, Royal Artillery which were attached to the brigade. 29th Brigade was under the command of U.S. I Corps and one of several UN formations responsible for holding the western flank on the lower Imjin river, the others being the 1st Republic of Korea (ROK) Division and the US 3rd Infantry Division (see map). The right flank of the ROK 12th Regiment, the nearest position of the ROK 1st Division, was a mile to the southwest of the Gloucestershire Regiment while the US 3rd Infantry Division stood east of 29th Brigade.

The deployment of UN forces meant that 29th Brigade with its four battalions had to cover a front of twelve miles. As a consequence, gaps between units had to be accepted because there was no possibility of forming a continuous line with the forces available. As a result, “Brigadier Brodie determined to deploy his men in separate unit positions, centred upon key hill features”. On the left flank, the Glosters were guarding a ford over the Imjin, known as Gloster crossing; the RNF were deployed near the centre, around two miles northeast of the Glosters; the Belgians on the right were the only element of 29th Brigade north of the river, occupying a feature called Hill 194. Their connection with the rest of the brigade depended on two pontoon bridges about half a mile apart from each other. These bridges connected the Belgians with Route 11, 29th Brigade’s main line of supply and communication and thus made vehicular movement between the north and the south bank of the river possible. The Royal Ulster Rifles served as the brigade’s reserve and were deployed along Route 11 (see map showing the situation at 9 a.m., 25 April below for different routes in the area).

The scattered deployment was one aspect which complicated the defense of 29th Brigade’s position. Another aspect was the lack of heavy artillery. Fire support was provided by 45 Field Regiment, RA, equipped with 25 pounders under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel M. T. Young and by 4.2 inch mortars of 170 Heavy Mortar Battery, RA. No heavier artillery support was available. Further support was provided by Centurion tanks of C Squadron, 8th Hussars, under the command of Major Henry Huth and by 55 Squadron, Royal Engineers. However, defensive preparations were not carried out very extensively because the British expected to hold the position for only a short time. As a result, neither minefields, deeply dug shelters nor extensive wire obstacles existed. The British position on the Imjin river "was deemed safe" but vulnerable in case of an attack.