Battle of Mount Austen, The Galloping Horse, and The Sea Horse - First Battle of Mount Austen

First Battle of Mount Austen

On 12 December 1942, a small group of Japanese soldiers from the 38th Field Engineer Regiment successfully infiltrated the American lines from the south, destroying a fighter aircraft and a fuel truck on Henderson Field before escaping back to friendly lines. Two days later, a U.S. Army patrol from the 132nd Infantry Regiment skirmished with a group of Japanese on the eastern slopes of Mount Austen. On 15 December, in yet another night infiltration raid onto Henderson Field, a Lieutenant Ono led four men equipped with picric acid blocks past American sentry positions. Bypassing rows of sleeping airmen, a gasoline dump with several hundred thousand gallons of high-octane fuel, a bomb dump with several hundred tons of stacked bombs, and numerous parked airplanes, each raider tied his explosive to the propeller of a P-39 Airacobra fighter, destroying that airplane only. Throughout the Guadalcanal campaign, Japanese forces would continue night infiltration tactics against U.S. forces, but causing few American casualties.

General Patch, however, was convinced that these events illustrated an unacceptable risk to Henderson Field by Japanese troops stationed on and around nearby Mount Austen. Thus, on 16 December, in preparation for a planned general offensive to try to destroy all Japanese forces remaining on Guadalcanal, Patch elected to first secure the Mount Austen area. He therefore ordered the Americal's 132nd Infantry Regiment to immediately seize the objective. While the 132nd Infantry had little modern combat experience aside from jungle skirmishes and patrols, it was proud of its combat history, having participated in both the Civil War and World War I, and its young reserve officers and NCOs considered themselves skilled in rifle and machinegun tactics and marksmanship.

The 132nd's commander—Colonel Leroy E. Nelson—directed his 3rd Battalion to lead the American assault on the first of several hills, followed by the regiment's 1st Battalion. Artillery support was provided by 105 mm howitzers from the U.S. Army's 246th Field Artillery Battalion and the 75 mm pack howitzers of the 2nd Battalion 10th Marines.

The exposed hills making up the Mount Austen complex were arbitrarily numbered by the Americans for reference purposes (see map at right). On 17 December, Nelson's 3rd Battalion—commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William C. Wright—advanced south of Hill 35 and began to climb toward Mount Austen's summit near Hills 20 and 21. In order to achieve its timetable set by the division commander, the battalion was forced to leave behind many of its support weapons, such as heavy mortars and machine guns, and to take only limited quantities of ammunition and supplies, all of which had to be hand-carried along hacked-out paths through thick jungle. At 09:30 on 18 December, as Wright's lead elements approached, Japanese defenders pinned down the Americans with machine-gun and rifle fire. Exhausted and dehydrated by their trek through the thick jungle, Wright's troops—unable to deploy quickly out of column formation—made no headway against the Japanese defenses.

The next morning, after an artillery barrage and air strike from the CAF, Wright went forward with several artillery observers to investigate the terrain in front of his forces. Using concealed fire lanes, a Japanese machine-gun team killed Wright with a burst of fire at 09:30. Wright's second in command, Major Louis Franco, was unable to get forward and take command until late in the day, preventing the battalion from continuing the attack. At the same time, Japanese riflemen infiltrated the American positions and effectively harassed the command posts of both the 3rd and 1st Battalions as well as the column of heavily loaded American supply and engineer parties on the hacked-out jungle trail linking the battalions with the Lunga perimeter. Both U.S. battalions dug in for the night while artillery bombarded the Japanese positions.

Between 20 and 23 December, the Japanese apparently withdrew from the area, for aggressive U.S. Army patrols encountered no more enemy in the area of Hills 20 and 21 and further to the south. Nelson ordered the two battalions to move west to Hill 31 and then attack south towards Hill 27. On 24 December, the 3rd Battalion was halted on the slopes of Hill 31 by intense machine-gun fire from well-concealed positions.

Facing the Americans was the most strongly fortified Japanese position on Guadalcanal, nicknamed the Gifu (after Gifu Prefecture in Japan) by the Japanese. The Gifu position sat between the summits of Mount Austen and Hills 27 and 31 and consisted of a 1,500 yd (1,400 m) line of 45–50 interconnected, mutually supporting, well-camouflaged pillboxes dug into the ground and forming a horseshoe shape with the open end to the west. Only about 3 ft (0.91 m) of each pillbox was above ground with walls and roofs, constructed from logs and dirt, up to 2 ft (0.61 m) thick. Each pillbox contained one to two machine-guns and several riflemen; some were sited underneath huge jungle trees. Each of these pillbox emplacements was sited to provide mutual support to the others. Numerous foxholes and trenches provided additional support and cover for additional riflemen and machine-gunners. Behind the pillboxes, the Japanese had sited 81 mm and long-range 90mm mortars. The Gifu was commanded by Major Takeyoshi Inagaki with around 800 men from the 2nd Battalion, 228th Regiment and the 2nd Battalion, 124th Infantry.

Between 25 and 29 December, the Japanese defenders prevented the Americans from making any headway in their attempt to overrun the Gifu position. While the U.S. 3rd Battalion—with artillery support—conducted frontal attacks against the position to pin the defenders, the U.S. 1st Battalion attempted to flank the Gifu on the east. However, as the Japanese defenses were fully integrated, the flanking attempt was unsuccessful. By 29 December, U.S. losses had reached 53 killed, 129 wounded, and 131 sick, though morale remained high. Assisting the Americans in this battle were Fijian commandos led by officers and non-commissioned officers from the New Zealand Expeditionary Force.

On 2 January, Nelson added his 2nd Battalion—commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George F. Ferry—to the offensive and sent them on a march around the Gifu toward Hill 27. The battalion reached the lower slopes of the hill by 16:00 without meeting serious resistance from the Japanese. This same day, Nelson—who was apparently exhausted and/or sick—was replaced as commander of the 132nd by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander M. George. Some sources suggest that he was physically and mentally exhausted and/or suffering from malaria and either requested his own relief or was ordered to relinquish command.

The next day, elements of the 132nd's 2nd Battalion occupied the summit of Hill 27, surprised and killed a Japanese 75 mm artillery crew, and successfully repulsed, with help from heavy artillery fire, six Japanese counterattacks on their positions. By this time, the soldiers atop Hill 27 were running extremely short of ammunition and grenades, with Japanese forces returning 10 shots to each one fired by the Americans, and medical supplies were exhausted. The 2nd's efforts to improve its position were made more difficult by the hard coral underneath the hill's sod, which made the digging of foxholes difficult. The remainder of the 2nd Battalion, carrying ammunition, food, and medical supplies, reached Hill 27 and joined the battle, where they soon gained combat superiority over the attacking Japanese. At the same time, with the infusion of new leadership by Lieutenant Colonel George, the 1st and 3rd Battalions attacked and pushed a short way into the Gifu, killing 25 Japanese in the process, then closed the gaps between their units and consolidated their positions, while killing many of the Japanese defenders. One officer from the 2nd Battalion—who had brought his personal sniper rifle to the battle—witnessed the final disintegration of Japanese units attacking Hill 27 with a final flurry of suicidal frontal charges. The Japanese soldiers in the Gifu, who had apparently not been resupplied or replenished during the battle, consumed their last remaining food rations on 1 January.

Since the beginning of its offensive on Mount Austen, the 132nd had lost 115 killed and 272 wounded. The relatively high number of combat deaths were caused in part by wound infections in the tropical conditions and inability to medevac men wounded in the early stages of the operation. Even after intervention by the 2nd Battalion, wounded men continued to die, unable to withstand the arduous and slippery portage back down improvised jungle trails on a stretcher carried by two men. These losses, plus the effects of tropical diseases, heat, and combat exhaustion, temporarily rendered the 132nd's 1st and 3rd Battalions incapable of further offensive action. Thus, on 4 January, the 1st and 3rd Battalions were ordered to dig in and hold positions surrounding the Gifu on the north, east, and south.

Reviewing the first Mount Austen offensive, former Marine officer and historian Samuel B. Griffith concluded, "As the thoroughly butchered Mount Austen operation dragged on into January, it became apparent that both Major General Patch and his assistant Division commander had much to unlearn, and perhaps even more to learn." However, while Patch's decision to attack Mount Austen was criticized, one participant noted the difficulties faced by the 132nd Regiment and its commanders, including the terrain, limited equipment (light mortars and machineguns with limited ammunition supply, no flamethrowers or pole charges), and the necessity of assaulting thoroughly integrated, prepared, and roofed-over Japanese defenses, which resisted direct hits by 75 mm and in some cases 105 mm shells.

For its part, once the 132nd was able to treat its wounded, morale remained high in the newly blooded regiment, which played a significant role in later combat operations on Guadalcanal. The 2nd Battalion, with just 27 killed, was immediately assigned to further offensive combat operations.

Losses among the Gifu defenders are unknown, but were estimated by one 2nd Battalion officer as of 9 January 1943 at 500 killed and wounded; most of the latter would later die of their wounds when combined with illness and starvation. A Japanese officer's diary recovered stated that the Japanese had suffered heavy casualties. Japanese prisoners captured in later operations referred to the combat at Hills 27 and 31 as The Battle of the Mountain of Blood.