Battle of Malvern Hill - Background

Background

The final battle of the Seven Days was the first in which the Union Army occupied favorable ground. For the preceding six days, McClellan's Army of the Potomac had been retreating to the safety of the James River, pursued by Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Up to this point, the major battles of the Seven Days had been mostly inconclusive, but McClellan was unnerved by Lee's aggressive assaults and remained convinced that he was seriously outnumbered, although in fact the two armies were roughly equal.

Malvern Hill offered good observation and artillery positions, having been prepared the previous day by the V Corps, under Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter. McClellan himself was not present on the battlefield, having preceded his army to Harrison's Landing on the James, and Porter was the most senior of the corps commanders. The slopes were cleared of timber, providing great visibility, and the open fields to the north could be swept by deadly fire from the 250 guns placed by Col. Henry J. Hunt, McClellan's chief of artillery. Three gunboats on the James River, the USS Galena, USS Jacob Bell, and USS Aroostook, added even more firepower. Beyond this space, the terrain was swampy and thickly wooded.

The entire Army of the Potomac occupied the hill, with the exception of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey's Division, now commanded by Brig. Gen. John J. Peck, of the IV Corps, which had proceeded to Harrison's Landing and, while not engaged, formed the extreme right of the Federal line. The Federal line extended in a vast semicircle from Harrison's Landing on the extreme right to Brig. Gen. George W. Morell's division of Porter's Corps on the extreme left, which occupied the geographically advantageous ground on the northwestern slopes of the hill. Adjoining the right of Morell's command was Brig. Gen. Darius N. Couch's division, which had been detached from the IV Corps, now at Harrison's Landing, and occupied the effective center of the Federal position. Although Porter commanded the portion of the field on which Couch's troops were positioned, he elected to allow Couch to act in command independently, not bringing his detached division under the command of one of the other corps commanders. Extending the Federal line on Couch's right were the divisions of Brig. Gens. Philip Kearny and Joseph Hooker of Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman's III Corps. To the right was Brig. Gen. Edwin Vose Sumner's II Corps, consisting of the divisions of Brig. Gens. Israel B. Richardson and John Sedgwick, which were anchored to Peck's Division of the IV Corps at Harrison's Landing. For the most part however, the Union infantry were passive spectators in the battle.

Rather than flanking the position, Lee attacked it directly, hoping that his artillery would clear the way for a successful infantry assault (just as he would plan the following year in Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg). He also believed that his soldiers were in better fighting shape than their Union counterparts, despite the six preceding days of hard fighting and marching. (A number of the Union Corps had in fact not yet participated in direct combat.) Lee's plan was to attack the hill from the north on the Quaker Road, using the divisions of Maj. Gens. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, Richard S. Ewell, D.H. Hill, and Brig. Gen. William H.C. Whiting. Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder was ordered to follow Jackson and deploy to his right when he reached the battlefield. Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger's division was to follow as well, but Lee reserved the right to position him based on developments. The divisions of Maj. Gens. James Longstreet and A.P. Hill, which had been the most heavily engaged in the Battle of Glendale the previous day, were held in reserve. Seeing how strong the Union position was, D.H. Hill opposed the idea of a direct attack, but Lee was confident that one final push would work.