Battle of Loc Ninh - Prelude

Prelude

In late December 1971, ARVN intelligence in the III Corps Tactical Zone had detected the buildup of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong formations across the border in neighbouring Cambodia. Even though it was obvious that preparations for a major Communist offensive were under way, South Vietnamese commanders were unable to predict their enemies' intentions. In January 1972, the Viet Cong 5th Division was reported to have taken up positions in Snuol, a Cambodian city located about 30 kilometres (19 mi) west of Lộc Ninh. South Vietnamese intelligence also detected the presence of the Viet Cong's 7th and 9th Divisions in Dambe and Chup respectively. Between January and May 1971, the South Vietnamese army mounted Operation Toan Thang TT02, with the aim of destroying Viet Cong main force divisions based in Cambodia, specifically in the Snuol area. But due to the death of General Đỗ Cao Trí, the commander of the ARVN III Corps Tactical Zone, in a helicopter accident, the South Vietnamese were forced to retreat from Snuol without achieving their objective.

In February and March 1972, South Vietnamese units patrolling the international border with Cambodia detected increased Communist activity in the Fishhook area, most notably the presence of the Viet Cong 5th Division in an area north of Bình Long Province. On 13 March, a South Vietnamese mechanized task force operating in Cambodia discovered a huge depot which contained large quantities of assault rifles, machine guns, rockets, anti-aircraft guns and ammunition in Base Area 354 (Svay Rieng Province) and Base Area 708 (Kampong Cham Province). On 27 March, a Việt Cộng deserter from a reconnaissance company of the 7th Division revealed that his unit was surveying a portion of road between Tây Ninh and Bình Long in preparation for its next move. Between 27 March and 1 April, more enemy prisoners and documents were captured by the South Vietnamese army, which revealed that the Viet Cong's 7th and 9th Divisions were coordinating their efforts against an unidentified target.

The movements of Communist forces near the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border during the first three months of 1972 clearly indicated that a major offensive was in the making. However, the whereabouts of the next Communist thrust was the topic which concerned South Vietnamese and U.S. intelligence officers the most. In previous offensives, the Communist had used Tây Ninh as an invasion route, as it was surrounded by Viet Cong bases in War Zone C, the Iron Triangle and the Parrot's Beak, Cambodia. South Vietnamese and U.S. military intelligence reached a consensus that Tây Ninh would be the next target for the Communist Easter Offensive. To reinforce that perception, on 2 April, the Viet Cong 24th Independent Regiment overran Fire Support Base Lac Long, defended by elements of the ARVN 49th Infantry Regiment, 5th Infantry Division, about 35 kilometres (22 mi) northwest of Tây Ninh.

The attacks on Lac Long and other outposts in Tây Ninh were a diversion designed to cover the main thrust into Bình Long Province. To initiate the campaign in Bình Long, the Viet Cong's 5th Division (numbering about 9,230 soldiers) was ordered to take Lộc Ninh, Bình Long's northernmost town. The Viet Cong were supported by the North Vietnamese 69th Artillery Command (3,830 soldiers) and the 203rd Armored Regiment (800 soldiers). In 1972, Lộc Ninh was a small district town situated on Route 13, home to about 4,000 people, mostly members of the various Montagnard tribes. The task of defending Lộc Ninh was entrusted to the ARVN 9th Infantry Regiment, 5th Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel Nguyễn Công Vinh. It was supported by the 1st Cavalry Squadron, 1st Regional Force Battalion, and elements of the 74th Ranger Battalion.

Prior to the battle, the 9th Infantry Regiment had occupied the former U.S. Special Forces compound at the south end of the airfield, which was about 0.8 kilometres (0.50 mi) west of the district center. The district headquarters was defended by more than 200 South Vietnamese Regional Forces soldiers, who operated from a Japanese-built fortified bunker system located north of the airfield. To assist the 9th Infantry Regiment, the U.S. military provided seven advisers. The U.S. advisory team at 9th Regimental Headquarters was led by Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. Schott, who was assisted by Major Albert E. Carlson and Captain Mark A. Smith, and two communication specialists, Sergeant First Class Howard B. Hull and Sergeant Kenneth Wallingford. Additionally, Captain George Wanat and Major Thomas Davidson operated from the north end of the airfield, attached to the district headquarters.