Battle of Hyderabad - Prelude

Prelude

The British became involved in the region of Sindh in Pakistan (at that time India), under the authority of Lord Ellenborough. In the year 1809 The Amirs of Sindh signed a treaty of “perpetual friendship” with the British and establish a local representative in the city of Hyderabad. With this arrival of British influence within the region, the Amirs of the Sindh lessen their internal struggles and turn instead to face this foreign presence. In 1838 the representative for Britain has the Amirs sign a political residency treaty, allowing a British residency in the city of Hyderabad, which paves the way for further British involvement in the area. This same treaty also stipulated that the British would fix the differences held between the rulers of the Sindh and those of the Punjab. Soon after, this would take be taken a step further in the signing of a treaty pushed by the British that would allow British troops to be stationed permanently in the the Sindh region for ‘the protection of the Amirs.’ The Amirs would also have to pay for a British resident in Hyderabad, who would negotiate all relations between the British and the Amirs.

The British maintained a policy of varying agreements with each of the Amirs, so as to please each individual and divide them by dealing with them separately. Captain James Outram was initially in charge of these dealings, and made significant progress with the Amirs, who began to confide in him. As a result, Outram was able to attain power over the Amirs’ foreign policy as well as to station his troops in the province. Tensions began to rise when the British, who were involved in the politics in Afghanistan at the time, told the Amirs they were needed to pay Shah Shujah Durrani 20 lacs (in rupees) as well as giving him land which he desired. This would both prove their allegiance to the British cause, as well as support Shah Shujah, who the British were supporting to take the throne in Afghanistan. The Amirs however, resented this proposal, which added to their discontentment with the dealings of the British. This attitude of the Amirs, both slow and unwilling to aid Shah Shujah in Aghanistan, and siding more with the Shah of Persia, greatly angered the British.

These relations took a turn for the worse when allegations were made of the Amirs communicating with the Shah of Persia, a rival of Shah Shujah and the British. It was after this incident that the British made it clear to the Amirs of the Sindh that any further cooperation with any people other than the British would lead to their destruction and their loss of rule in the Sindh. The distrust between the British and the Amirs of the Sindh continued to worsen, as both sides grew more and more suspicious of each other. Both sides continued on, feigning normality while both were aware of the other’s mistrust. As a result of their distrust, the British began to keep a close eye on Noor Mohammed Khan, one of the most prominent Amirs, at his residence in Hyderabad.

In 1841, the British appointed Charles Napier for service in India at the age of of 59. The following year Napier arrived in Bombay on 26 August. Upon his arrival he was told of the situation that existed between the British and the Amirs, and that the Amirs were making trouble for the British. On 10 September 1842 Napier arrived in the Sindh. Under Napier, British control saw some charity on their occupation of Sindh and the territory of the Amirs. There was a belief that the British were, in fact, improving life for many in the area, as they saw the Amirs as overly wealthy rulers over a poor people. Napier was also very much of a mind to expand and tighten British control. Previously Outram had been in charge of negotiations between the British and the Amirs and had been very lenient towards the Amirs, which they appreciated greatly. Napier, on the other hand, not only longed for campaign, but was also very authoritarian with regards to the British rule in the area, and wanted to see full control by the British. Napier himself was charged by Ellenborough to look into the matter of the Amirs’ duplicity, to find evidence of their suspicious behaviour, and to compile it into a report which he would submit to Ellenborough. However, due to the fact that Napier was fresh to the Sindh and knew none of the language which would allow him to understand the pieces of alleged evidence against the Amirs, Napier was left with a difficult task.

Napier’s 200 page report, once completed was submitted to Ellenborough, who received the report on November 3. The report was fairly inaccurate in its information about the Amirs, and Ellenborough sent his reply the day after as well as draft of a new treaty to be made with the Amirs. The speed of the reply, as well as the fact that it was accompanied by a drafted treaty, would indicate that Ellenborough had made his decision and the draft even before receiving Napier’s report. Ellenborough’s reply urged Napier to find convicting evidence of the actions of the Amirs - of which he had fairly little. His most incriminating piece of evidence was a letter supposably written by the Amir, but which might easily have been a forgery, of which Napier was aware. As a result, Napier wrote to Ellenborough again, telling him of the small pieces of evidence that he had and asked for Ellenborough’s help in the situation. However, Ellenborough relied saying that he agreed with the verdict made by Napier - though he had not concretely insinuated one.