Battle of Havana (1762) - Siege

Siege

On 6 June the British force came into sight of Havana. Immediately, 12 British ships of the line were sent to the mouth of the entrance channel to block in the Spanish fleet. The British planned to begin the operations by the reduction of the Morro fortress, on the north side of the channel, through a formal Vauban-style siege. The commanding position of this fort over the city would then force the Spanish commander to surrender. However, this plan did not take into account the fact that the fortress was located on a rocky promontory where it was impossible to dig approach trenches and that a large ditch cut into the rock protected the fort on the land side.

The Spanish force under Prado and Admiral Hevia, surprised by the size of the attacking force, adopted a delaying defensive strategy, hoping for a relief force or for an epidemic of yellow fever among the besiegers or for a hurricane destroying the British fleet. Accordingly, the Spanish fleet was kept in the harbour while its sailors, gunners and marines were sent to garrison the fortresses of Morro and Punta which were placed under the command of naval officers. Most of the shot and powder of the fleet as well as its best guns were also transferred to these two fortresses. Meanwhile, regular troops were assigned to the defence of the city.

The channel entrance was immediately closed with the boom chain. Furthermore, 3 ships of the line (Asia (64), Europa (64) and Neptuno (74)) were selected among the fleet for their poor condition and sunk behind the boom chain. Realising the importance of the Morro, the Spanish commanders gave it top priority.

On 7 June the British troops were landed northeast of Havana, and began advancing west the next day. They met a militia party that was easily pushed back. By the end of the day, British infantry had reached the vicinity of Havana. The defence of the Morro was assigned to Luis Vicente de Velasco e Isla, a naval officer, who immediately took measures to prepare and provision the fortress for a siege.

On 11 June a British party stormed a detached redoubt on the Cavannos heights. Only then did the British command realise how strong the Morro was, surrounded by brushwood and protected by a large ditch. With the arrival of their siege train the next day, the British began erecting batteries among the trees on La Cabana hill overlooking the Morro (some 7 metres (23 ft) higher) as well as the city and the bay. Surprisingly, this hill had been left undefended by the Spanish army despite its well known strategic importance. The king of Spain had even instructed Prado to fortify this hill, a task that he considered the most urgent among those confided to his commander.

On 13 June a British detachment landed at Torreón de la Chorrera, on the south side of the harbour. Meanwhile, Colonel Patrick Mackellar, an engineer, was overseeing the construction of the siege works against the Morro. Since digging trenches was impossible, he resolved to erect breastworks instead. He planned to mine towards a bastion of the Morro once his siege works would have reached the ditch and to create a runway across this ditch with the rubble produced by his mining activities.

On 22 June, 4 British batteries totalling 12 heavy guns and 38 mortars opened fire on the Morro from La Cabana. Mackellar gradually advanced his breastworks towards the ditch under cover of these batteries.

By 29 June, the British batteries had increased their daily direct hits on the Morro to 500. Velasco was losing as many as 30 men each day, and the workload of repairing the fortress every night was so exhausting that men had to be rotated into the fort from the city every three days. Velasco finally managed to convince Prado that a raid was necessary against the British batteries. At dawn on 29 June 988 men (a mixed company of grenadiers, marines, engineers, and slaves) attacked the siege works. They reached the British batteries from the rear and started to spike guns, but British reaction was swift, and the attackers were repulsed before they caused any serious damage.

On 1 July, the British launched a combined land and naval attack on the Morro. The fleet detached 4 ships of the line for this purpose: HMS Stirling Castle, HMS Dragon, HMS Marlborough and HMS Cambridge. The naval and land artilleries simultaneously opened fire on the Morro. However, naval guns were ineffective, the fort being located too high. Counter-fire from 30 guns of the Morro inflicted 192 casualties and seriously damaged the ships, three of which later sank, forcing them to withdraw. Meanwhile, the bombardment by the land artillery was far more effective. By the end of the day, only 3 Spanish guns were still effective on the side of the Morro facing the British batteries.

On 2 July, the British breastworks around the Morro caught fire and the batteries were burned down, destroying the product of much of the work undertaken since mid June. Velasco immediately capitalized on this event, remounting many guns and repairing breaches in the fortifications of the Morro.

Since its arrival at Havana, the British army had heavily suffered from yellow fever. It was now at half strength. Since the hurricane season was approaching, Albemarle was now engaged in a race against time. He ordered the batteries to be rebuilt with the help of men of the fleet. Many 32-pdrs were taken from the lower deck of several ships to equip these new batteries.

By 17 July the new British batteries had progressively silenced most of Velasco's guns, leaving only two of them operational. With the absence of artillery cover, it now became impossible for the Spanish troops to repair the damage being inflicted on the Morro. Mackellar was also able to resume construction of siege works to approach the fortress. With the army in such a bad condition, work progressed rather slowly. All hope of the British army now resided in the expected arrival of reinforcements from North America.

On 20 July the progress of siege works allowed the British to begin the mining towards the right bastion of the Morro. Meanwhile, the now unopposed British artillery was daily hitting the Morro up to 600 times, causing some 60 casualties. Velasco had now no hope but to destroy British siege works. At 4 am on 22 July 1,300 regulars, seamen and militia sallied from Havana in three columns and attacked the siege works surrounding the Morro. The sortie did not succeed and the siege works were left relatively intact.

On 24 July Albemarle offered Velasco the opportunity to surrender, allowing him to write his own terms of capitulation. Velasco answered that the issue would rather be settled by force of arms.

On 27 July the reinforcements from North America led by Colonel Burton finally arrived. During their journey, they had been attacked by the French, who captured some 500 men. These reinforcements consisted of:

• 46th Thomas Murray's Regiment of Foot
• 58th Anstruther's Regiment of Foot
• American provincials (3,000 men)
• Gorham's rangers

On 29 July the mine near the right bastion of the Morro fort was completed and ready to explode. Albemarle vainly feigned an assault, hoping that Velasco would finally decide to surrender. On the contrary, Velasco decided to launched a desperate attack from the sea upon the British miners in the ditch.

At 2:00 am on 30 July two Spanish schooners attacked the miners from the sea. Their attack was unsuccessful and they had to withdraw. At 1:00 pm the British finally detonated the mine. The debris of the explosion partly filled the ditch but Albemarle judged it passable, and launched an assault, sending 699 picked men against the right bastion. Before the Spanish could react, 16 men gained a foothold on the bastion. Velasco then rushed to the breach with his troops. He was mortally wounded during the ensuing hand-to-hand fighting. Once the British were in control of the Morro fort Velasco was transported to Havana.

At 9:00 pm on 31 July, Velasco died of his wound. The British now occupied a position commanding the city as well as the bay. They built batteries along the north side of the entrance channel from the Morro fort to La Cabana hill.

On 11 August, after Prado had rejected the demand for surrender sent to him by Albermarle, the British batteries opened fire on Havana. A total of 47 guns (15 x 32-pdrs, 32 x 24-pdrs), 10 mortars and 5 howitzers pounded the city from a distance of 500-800m. By the end of the day Fort la Punta was silenced. Prado had no other choice left but to surrender.