Cuito Cuanavale
By November, the SADF had cornered the remnants of three FAPLA units on the east of the Cuito River, across from the town itself and was poised to destroy them. The quite demoralised 59th FAPLA motorised infantry brigade, 21st and 25th FAPLA light infantry brigades, in positions near Tumpo and east of the Cuito River, were effectively cut off due to SADF artillery control of both the bridge and airstrip and to UNITA guerrilla control of the road from Menongue, which they had mined and were prepared to ambush. With no functioning armour or artillery remaining, the FAPLA-units faced annihilation. On 15 November, the Angolan government requested urgent military assistance from Cuba. Although not responsible for the dismal situation of the FAPLA Cuba felt impelled to intervene in order to prevent a total disaster for the Angolans. In Castro's view, a South African victory would have meant not only the capture of Cuito and the destruction of the best Angolan military formations, but, quite probably, the end of Angola's existence as an independent country. Thus, Fidel Castro responded immediately by sending — in what was called "Maniobra XXXI Aniversario de las FAR" — materiel and 15 000 elite troops, retaking the initiative from the Soviets. The first Cuban reinforcements in Cuito arrived by helicopter on 5 December with about 160–200 technicians, advisers, officers, and special forces.
General Arnaldo Ochoa, a veteran of the 1976 Angola campaign and of tank battles in Ethiopia, was made overall commander of the forces on the government side. Ochoa and Castro were to have serious disagreements in the conduct of the war in Angola. These tensions were to have repercussions both during the war where Castro's interference with defense plans may have cost the Cubans dozens of lives and in the aftermath of Angolan hostilities a year later when Ochoa was arrested, tried and executed by firing squad after being found guilty of treason. General Cintras Frias was made commander at Cuito Cuanavale. The Cuban's initial priority was securing Cuito Cuanavale, but while reinforcements were arriving at the besieged garrison they made preparations for a second front to the west of Cuito Cuanavale in Lubango where the SADF had been operating unhindered for 8 years.
On 25 November the UN Security Council demanded the SADF's unconditional withdrawal from Angola by 10 December, yet, without threatening any sanctions. Through December the situation for the besieged Angolans became critical as the SADF tightened the noose around Cuito Cuanavale. Observers expected it to fall into South African hands any time soon and UNITA prematurely announced the town had been taken.
As of 21 December the SADF planned the final assault "pick off" the FAPLA units which were still caught to the east of the Cuito river "before moving in to occupy the town if the conditions were favourable". On 9 January the SADF destroyed the important bridge across the Cuito river using a smart bomb. The Cubans managed to construct a wooden footbridge in its place which they baptised Patria o Muerte (fatherland or death).) They partly buried disabled tanks so that their turrets could be used as fixed artillery pieces.
The SADF brought up reinforcements and then carried out, beginning 13 January until 23 March, the first of what would prove to be six major ground assaults on the entrenched FAPLA positions east of the river, none of which delivered tangible results. A large Cuban and FAPLA column was on the way from Menongue for the relief of Cuito Cuanavale, but progress in the rainy season was slow due to the need to clear the UNITA minefields and guard against possible ambushes. They did not reach Cuito Cuanavale in time to take part in the first engagement.
Although the first attack on 13 January 1988 was successful, spelling near disaster for a FAPLA brigade, the SADF unable to continue withdrew to its starting positions. A month later, on 14 February, the SADF withdrew from a second assault after successfully driving FAPLA-Cuban units off the Chambinga high ground. Close to a catastrophe, the FAPLA units east of the Cuito River withdrew to the Tumpo (river) triangle, a smaller area, ideally suited to defence. In a third assault on 19 February the SADF suffered a first major setback when it was repelled by FAPLA battalion north of the Dala river; unable to reach FAPLA's forward positions the SADF had to withdraw. In the following days the Cubans stepped up their air attacks against South African positions. On 25 February the FAPLA-Cubans repelled a fourth assault and the SADF had to return to its positions east of the Tumpo River. The failure of this attack "proved a turning point of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, boosting FAPLA's flagging morale and bringing the South African advance to a standstill." A fifth SADF-attack was beaten back on 29 February delivering a third consecutive defeat. After some more preparation the South Africans launched their last and fourth unsuccessful attack on 23 March. As SADF-Colonel Jan Breytenbach wrote, the South African assault "was brought to a grinding and definite halt" by the combined Cuban and Angolan forces.
Eventually Cuban troop strength in Angola increased to about 55,000, with 40,000 deployed in the south. Due to the international arms embargo since 1977, South Africa’s aging air force was outclassed by sophisticated Soviet-supplied air defence systems and air-strike capabilities fielded by the Cubans and Angolans and it was unable to uphold the air supremacy it had enjoyed for years; its loss in turn proved to be critical to the outcome of the battle on the ground. The Cuito airstrip was kept in repair, but since it was under constant observation by the SADF artillery and air force it could not be safely used by fixed wing aircraft.
After the failed assault on 23 March 1988 under orders from Pretoria the SADF withdrew the bulk of their forces, initially leaving a 1,500-man "holding force" behind (Combat Group 20) to continue deception operations and lay mines in order to prevent or slow any FAPLA offensive operations. For months it continued to shell Cuito Cuanavale and the airstrip using their long-range G-5 artillery from a distance of 30 to 40 km. While the Cubans had purported to be moving south into Namibia according to comments from Castro they instead moved to cut off elements of the SADF. The SADF had left much of its powerful G-5 artillery units in place due to the difficulty in transporting during the rainy season. For whatever reasons—possibly not wanting to upset strategic negotiations, willingness to risk casualties or similar difficulties with mechanized forces—the Cubans did not attempt to take the SADF positions and settled for surrounding the small force.
With that manoeuvre, Fidel Castro increased the cost to South Africa of continuing to fight in Angola and placed Cuba in its most aggressive combat position of the war, thus fortifying his argument that Cubans were preparing to leave Angola with their opponents on the defensive.
Read more about this topic: Battle Of Cuito Cuanavale