Battle of Camperdown - de Winter's Cruise

De Winter's Cruise

For more details on this topic, see Order of battle at the Battle of Camperdown.

By the middle of August 1797, after six weeks of constant easterly winds that kept his ships trapped in their harbour, De Winter decided that an attempt to join the French at Brest as the first stage of an invasion of Ireland was impractical and he abandoned the plan. In part this decision was due to the strength of Duncan's reconstituted fleet, which had increased to 17 ships of the line with the addition of the vessels returned from the Nore. Duncan's men were also better trained and more experienced than their Dutch counterparts, having spent considerably longer at sea and having been taught to fire three rounds a minute to the Dutch two. In addition to his concerns about the proficiency of his men, De Winter was also worried about their loyalty: the dominion of France over the Batavian Republic and the country's enforced participation in distant theatres of warfare were unpopular among the Dutch people. Although De Winter was an avowed republican, who had fought in the French Army against the Netherlands between 1793 and 1795, support for the House of Orange remained strong among the Dutch population and with the fleet's sailors. Wolfe Tone wrote in frustration that "The destiny of Europe might have been changed for ever . . . the great occasion is lost, and we must do as well as we can."

When news of this decision reached the Admiralty, they recalled Duncan's blockade fleet to Yarmouth for a refit on 1 October, the admiral insisting on sending some of his ships back to the Dutch coast two days later under Captain Henry Trollope in HMS Russell accompanied by HMS Adamant and the small ships HMS Beaulieu, HMS Circe and HMS Martin with the hired lugger Black Joke. Their arrival off Texel on 6 October coincided with De Winter's much delayed expedition. Although some sources, particularly in France, have claimed that De Winter was determined to bring Duncan to battle, in reality he was more concerned that his men were disaffected and inexperienced by their long stay in port, and had reluctantly acceded to orders from the Batavian government to conduct a brief sweep in the Southern North Sea in search of weak British forces that could be overwhelmed by his fleet or drawn into the dangerous shallow waters of the Dutch coastline. He may also have been hoping to resurrect the plan to augment the French at Brest if he was able to pass westwards down the English Channel undetected. His fleet consisted of 16 ships of the line and a number of smaller support craft, and his orders from The Hague included instructions to remember "how frequently Dutch Admirals have maintained the honour of the Dutch flag, even when the enemy's forces were sometimes superior to theirs." Preparing the ships for sea took some time, and the Dutch did not manage to leave the Texel until 10:00 on 8 October, De Winter turning southwest in the hope of linking with another Dutch ship of the line at the mouth of the River Maas. Within hours, Trollope had discovered and followed De Winter.

The Dutch fleet was watched constantly by the ships Duncan had sent to observe them, and when Dutch preparations to sail were observed a message was sent back to Duncan informing him of the Dutch movements. The despatch vessel flew the signal for an enemy as it entered Yarmouth roads early in the morning on 9 October, so that by the time it had docked the British fleet was already preparing to sail, Duncan sending the final message to the Admiralty: "The wind is now in the NE and shall make good course over to them, and if it please God, hope to get at them. The squadron under my command are unmoored and I shall put to sea immediately." Before midday, Duncan had sailed with the 11 ships that were ready and steered for the mouth of the Texel, intending to intercept De Winter on his return. By evening his fleet was at full strength, three stragglers having rejoined, and on the afternoon of 10 October his ships were anchored off the Dutch port, scouts reporting 22 merchant ships in the harbour but no sign of De Winter's warships. Since leaving the Texel, De Winter had been unable to escape from Trollope's ships: on the evening of 10 October, several Dutch vessels were detached to drive his squadron away while the Dutch fleet lay off the Maas, but could not close with the faster British vessels. Having failed to make the rendezvous off the Maas, De Winter then turned to the northwest, cruising off Lowestoft in Suffolk and again unsuccessfully attempting to drive away Trollope's squadron. There, reports from Dutch fishing vessels of Duncan's appearance off the Texel reached De Winter and he immediately recalled his ships and ordered the fleet to turn back towards the Dutch coast, aiming for the village of Scheveningen. Meanwhile, further messages from Trollope reporting the Dutch movements had reached Duncan and he turned his fleet west, following the Dutch coastline. At 07:00 on the morning of 11 October Trollope's squadron sighted sails to the northeast and, after confirming that they were Duncan's fleet, signalled that the Dutch fleet was approximately 3 nautical miles (5.6 km) further to the southwest, becoming visible to the fleet by 08:30. The first clear sighting was reported by Captain Peter Halkett of Circe, who had climbed the mainmast to get a better view. At this point, the Dutch were sailing towards land, approximately 9 nautical miles (17 km) off the coast of Noord-Holland, close to the village of Camperduin. The weather was poor, with heavy seas and strong wind from the southeast broken by frequent rain squalls, but this did not prevent hundreds of Dutch civilians gathering on the dunes to watch the impending combat.