Automatism (case Law) - Voluntariness

Voluntariness

La Forest J. in the Canadian Supreme Court case of R v Parks (1992) 75 CCC (3d) 287, 302 asserted that automatism is "conceptually a subset of the voluntariness requirement." One of the main rationales of criminal law is to use the threat of punishment as a deterrent to future wrongdoing. But, if an individual is to be deterred, he or she must be acting under voluntary control. If something is interfering with this control, automatism may be available as an excuse. Duress is not an example of involuntary action as although the choices faced by the person under duress may be difficult, nonetheless they are still acting voluntarily. Some would describe action under duress as non-voluntary as opposed to involuntary. This distinction is emphasized by the exclusion of the defence of duress for murder. In the words of the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Milloy (1991) 54 A Crim. R. 340, Thomas J. says at 342-343, that for automatism to succeed:

impairment of relevant capacities as distinct from total deprivation of these capacities … it is fundamental to a defence of automatism that the actor has no control over his actions.