Association Football Positions - Tactical Evolution

Tactical Evolution

In the early days of association football, the game was very much focused on attack and, as such, many teams (e.g. Royal Engineers, 1872) played with a 1–2–7 formation (one defender, two mid-fielders and seven attackers). The single defender was known as the three-quarter-back, and he was supported in part by two half-backs from mid-field who would be in charge of orchestrating the game with short passing. Up front, the seven forwards were split into four wing forwards and three centre forwards. The wingers' main task was to use their pace to pick up on the long balls sent forward by the half- and three-quarter-backs, whereas the centre forwards were charged with taking the short passes from the half-backs.

In order to combat the short-passing threat, the championship-winning Preston North End side of 1888 devised a more defensive 2–3–5 formation (two defenders, three mid-fielders and five attackers), which would become the standard formation for many teams for the best part of the next 40 years. One of the half-backs was brought back into defence, which sat deeper than before, making the two defenders full-backs as opposed to three-quarter-backs. Their main job was to mark the opposition's inside forwards and cut out the short passes in mid-field. Furthermore, two forwards were brought back into midfield as half-backs to mark the opposition wingers and negate the pace threat. The remaining half-back became a centre-back, who would patrol the field, drifting from defence to attack as he saw fit. This left two wingers up front (outside-right and outside-left), along with two inside-forwards (inside-right and inside-left) and a centre-forward.

Up until this point, for an attacking player to be onside, there had to be at least three opposing players closer to their goal-line than the attacker. In the 1920s, the offside rule was changed so that only two opposing players were required between the attacker and the goal-line for the attacker to still be onside. This made it easier for attackers to score against the two-man defences of the day. To combat this, Arsenal manager Herbert Chapman devised a system that utilised three defenders as opposed to the usual two. This system was complemented by a strict man-marking regime, whereby the centre-back – who had now retreated to the centre of the three man defence – would stick as close to the opposing centre-forward as possible, while the full-backs – who had moved further wide to accommodate the centre-back – would mark the wingers. This left two mid-fielders in a slightly less advanced position than before to act as wing-halves who would have the dual responsibility of loosely marking the inside forwards and providing the forwards with the ball. This was helped by the slight withdrawal of the inside forwards from the front line. Chapman's formation was referred to as the W–M formation due to its appearance on the field with all the players in their described positions.

A variation of the W–M formation was the Hungarian M–U formation used to great effect against England in 1953, when they became the first non-British side to beat England at the old Wembley Stadium. This formation was so-called because of the deep-lying centre-forward Nándor Hidegkuti, used to draw the opposition centre-back out of position, leaving plenty of space between the full-backs for the inside-forwards Ferenc Puskás and Sándor Kocsis to exploit.

In 1958, the Brazilians won their first of five World Cups to date thanks to the "flat back four" system they had developed to counter the Hungarians' M–U. Two centre-backs would mark the inside-forwards' runs from deep, while the wider full-backs would not only cut out the threat of the opposing wingers but also provide width on the counter-attack. The relative lack of numbers in the middle of the park meant a creative presence was required, and for the Brazilians, that presence was provided in the form of their dazzling midfielder Didi. Also in Mario Zagallo they had a left winger years ahead of his time, proficient at funnelling back and helping out the midfield when the team lost possession.

By 1962 the Brazilian 4-2-4 formation evolved into an asymmetrical 4-3-3, with Mario Zagallo now playing as a left wide midfielder instead of a left defensive outside forward/winger.

The advent of the Italian "Catenaccio" (bolt) system came soon after, and was a more defensive variation on the Brazilians' 4–2–4 system. Two forwards were withdrawn to leave just two up front, and an extra midfielder was added to bolster the midfield. However, the major tactical innovation with this formation was the floating sweeper, often referred to in Italian as a "libero", or "free man". While the four main defenders would have the task of strict man-marking the opposition forwards, the libero would act as a sponge, mopping up any attacks that might happen to get through the tight defence. Franz Beckenbauer of Bayern Munich gave the position a more attacking role and played a major part as captain of the West Germany side that won the World Cup in 1974 and came third in 1970.

Meanwhile, the English had also developed a tactical formation that lay somewhere between a 4–2–4, a 4–4–2 and a 4–3–3. The flat back four that had become so popular remained intact, but the midfield was a free-flowing unit with players given license to attack as the scenario saw fit. In defence, using the 1966 World Cup side as an example, Martin Peters, Bobby Charlton and Alan Ball would all stay back to counter the opposition attack. However, in attack they had two options: Peters and Ball could charge forward, creating problems for the opposition out wide with their pace and crossing ability, creating either a 4–2–4 formation or a 3-3-4 formation when one of the fullbacks pushed forward; or Charlton could burst through the middle of the strike partnership of Roger Hunt and Geoff Hurst and overload the centre of the opposition defence, providing either an extra man in the box or an effective long-shot alternative. The unsung hero of Alf Ramsey's England side was Nobby Stiles, who was the midfield linchpin, whom the team relied on in defence when Charlton surged forward in support of the strikers.

The 1970s saw the coming of the Dutch "Total Football" scheme. While not burdened with a specific, rigid formation, the system relied on extremely versatile players who were able to fill in at any position the circumstances of the game required them to. One such player was the legendary Johan Cruijff, who epitomised the Total Football ideology by being able to play in almost every outfield position. A major criticism of this style of play was that, for the Dutch national side, it never yielded a major trophy, though it did help them to reach two consecutive World Cup finals (1974 and 1978). The argument is somewhat negated by the fact that the Ajax side that Cruijff played in won three consecutive European Cup titles in the early-to-mid 1970s.

At the 1986 World Cup, Argentina's Carlos Bilardo unveiled a 3-5-2 formation (or perhaps, more precisely, 3-5-1-1) as his playmaker, Diego Maradona, also operated a as second striker.

The last major tactical evolution occurred in the late 1980s/early 1990s, when the AC Milan side played with a variation on the 4–4–2 formation. This formation relied extensively on the four defenders' ability to work as a unit in order to spring the offside trap on slower attackers, as well as the stamina of the midfielders who would be expected to pressure the opposition as soon as they gained possession of the ball. In attack, the team would play short passes within the midfield, using their crisp passing and dynamic movement to open up holes in the defence and create attacking opportunities.

The 2010 World Cup confirmed a general shift toward a broadly counter-attacking, reactive 4–2–3–1 by the world's more successful teams. Indeed, of the four semi-finalists in that tournament, all but Uruguay employed some variation of this tactic. This shape tends to utilize fluid movement between the four wing players, with full-backs expected to provide plenty of support to the wingers in front of them. Following the World Cup, most of the world's major leagues have seen this tactic being used by an increasing number of teams.