Aristotelian Ethics - Moral Virtue

Moral Virtue

Moral virtue, or excellence of character, concerns what we do voluntarily, and not what we do because we are forced to do so. The traditional word for the opposite of virtue is vice.

Aristotle believed that every ethical virtue or positive character trait can be described as a pleasant intermediate activity, between a painful excess and a painful deficiency. But seeing what is most pleasant and most painful in truth is not something everyone can easily do, especially if they were poorly raised and inexperienced. Another way Aristotle describes each of the moral virtues is as a correct aiming at what is beautiful (kalos).

For example, courageous (or literally manly) action is a mean between the painful activities of fear and rash overconfidence. Too much fear or too little confidence leads to cowardice, and too little fear or too much confidence can lead to rash, foolish choices. (Such philosophies of aiming at a middle ground are often referred to as The Golden Mean.) But courage is also described as an ability to rationally choose the beautiful, which in some cases can be a beautiful death.

Aristotle distinguishes virtue and vice in their true sense as stable dispositions (hexeis) about what they would consciously choose between perceived pleasant and painful options. Dispositions to feel emotions are distinguished by Aristotle as something other than virtues or vices, although they can also be seen as a mean between two extremes, and these are also to some extent a result of up-bringing and habituation. Two examples of such dispositions would be modesty, or a tendency to feel shame, which Aristotle discusses in NE IV.9; and righteous indignation (nemesis), which is a balanced feeling of sympathetic pain concerning the undeserved pleasures and pains of others. Exactly which habitual dispositions are virtues or vices and which only concern emotions, differs between the different works which have survived, but the basic examples are consistent, as is the basis for distinguishing them in principle.

Some people, despite their perceptions and habits concerning what they think is beautiful and pleasant, act on the basis of emotions, even though it is not what they choose. This is not vice according to Aristotle's definition, but "akrasia", sometimes called weakness of will or lack of self-mastery in English translations. In English, the person who would choose the virtuous option but does not, is sometimes translated as "incontinent" in opposition to having vice or being "vicious".

One apparent emotion is separated from the others and not treated as an emotion by Aristotle, and this is "thumos", the spiritedness which is the cause of anger. Aristotle, like Plato in his Socratic dialogues, treats thumos as an important and positive part of the human soul, which helps a well brought-up young person become virtuous. Thumos is not an emotion (pathos) according to Aristotle because it tries to follow the leadership of the rational part of the soul which makes conscious decisions. The true emotions on the other hand, are able to distort rational thinking and dominate it.

Aristotle's described how people become virtuous by performing virtuous actions, which they might not have chosen themselves when young. They must develop proper habits during childhood and this usually requires help from teachers, parents, and law-makers. A good community is normally required for the development of good people.

Virtue in the highest sense, in an adult who has been brought up well, will not just involve good personal habits such as courage and temperance, but also friendship and justice and intellectual virtue.