Anatta - Nibbana and Anatta

Nibbana and Anatta

Two characteristics of nibbana are permanence and an absence of suffering. The relationship between nibbana and the anatta is a different matter. Walpola Rahula shows that the early attempts of Western scholars to find the atman doctrine in the Pali canon are a result of mistranslations of the original Pali. Rahula further says, though, that in declaring "all dhammas are anatta," the Buddha included even nirvana in his blanket statement that all things are not one's self; this standard Theravada interpretation also hinges on interpreting the word "sankhara" in the widest sense. Peter Harvey agrees with this interpretation; see below.

Thanissaro Bhikkhu and Nanavira Thera disagree, finding that the word "dhamma" is used here only to refer to objects of mental consciousness or mental analysis. They instead assert that the self/not-self analysis does not extend to nibbana at all. While there are passages that describe nibbana as an object of consciousness (such as AN 9.36), this applies only up to the level of non-returning. For the arahant, however, it is directly known without mediation of the mental consciousness factor in dependent co-arising, and is the transcending of all dhammas. In SN V.6, for one example, the Buddha calls the attainment of the goal the transcending of all dhammas; thus nibbana cannot always be included in the scope of the word "dhamma." In fact, according to Thanissaro Bhikkhu, the teaching "all dhammas are not-self" applies directly to those who experience nibbana without finality; its use in verses 277-279 of the Dhammapada make clear that the statement is directed at the path, not the goal. The statement reminds the meditator that he or she should not regard the deathless with any form of self-identification, and thus clinging, at all.

Nanavira Thera holds that "all dhammas are not-self" can be read as "all objects of mental analysis are not-self." Since "self" arises in the first place merely as a delusive figment of the mind, and is then attributed by the mind to "the five aggregates of clinging or one of them," a statement that mental analysis finds no "self" in any of its objects is, given the fact that the mind is the only means there is of investigating anything at all, equivalent to a complete denial of the "self" concept.

According to this analysis, the Buddha did not make the metaphysical assertion that nibbana is not self, but neither did he hold the metaphysical view that it is self. In fact, a statement by the Buddha that nibbana is atta or that it is anatta is nowhere to be found in the Canon, and according to Nanavira Thera, both statements regarding nibbana from the perspective of the arahant are inconsistent with statements he did make. In this analysis, the self/not-self dichotomy simply is not applicable there. As AN 4.174 states, to even ask if there is anything remaining or not remaining (or both, or neither) after the complete realization of unconditioned consciousness is to differentiate what is by nature undifferentiated (or to complicate the uncomplicated). The range of differentiation goes only as far as the "All:"

The Blessed One said, 'What is the All? Simply the eye and forms, ear and sounds, nose and aromas, tongue and flavors, body and tactile sensations, intellect and ideas. This, monks, is called the All. Anyone who would say, "Repudiating this All, I will describe another," if questioned on what exactly might be the grounds for his statement, would be unable to explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. Why? Because it lies beyond range."

Perceptions of self or not-self, which would count as differentiation, would not apply beyond the "All." Thus someone who is not liberated should not cling to any object of the six sense spheres, including nirvana if it has been tasted but not fully realized, as a permanent self, and for a liberated individual who has gone beyond experiencing nirvana as an object, ideas of self and non-self do not apply.

Peter Harvey agrees with the Theravada view that "all dhammas are not-Self" includes nibbana in its scope. He states, "where Self and nibbana differ is with respect to the very aspect of Self-hood, I-ness." He continues, "Nibbana itself is not-Self as it is the stopping of the breeding-ground for the 'I am' attitude, beyond all possibility of I-ness. Thus, where there was formerly impermanence and a supposed 'I', there is now permanence and no grounds at all for 'I'. All the personality-factors are dropped because they fall short of the Self-ideal ... is that which is 'not dependent on another' attained by not depending on anything as 'Self. It is the 'ultimate empty thing', which is true permanence and happiness."

As one scholar has written,

If one would characterize the forms of mysticism found in the Pali discourses, it is none of the nature-, God-, or soul-mysticism of F.C. Happold. Though nearest to the latter, it goes beyond any ideas of 'soul' in the sense of immortal 'self' and is better styled 'consciousness-mysticism.'