Abu Yusuf - Doctrine and Methodology

Doctrine and Methodology

As a disciple of Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf's doctrine largely presupposes that of his mentor. His writings and prominent political positions helped advance the Hanafi school of Islamic law throughout the Islamic empire. While most of his legal opinions (fatwas) were firmly rooted in the doctrine and methodology espoused by his former teacher, there are some points on which he diverged and revealed his own legal thought. The doctrine of Abu Yusuf was more dependent on traditions (ahadith) than his master, in part because there were more authoritative prophetic traditions available to him in his time. He also reacted against the somewhat unrestrained reasoning exhibited by Abu Hanifa. However, he was not always consistent; in a certain number of cases he disregarded sounder and more highly developed doctrine by diverging from the opinions of his former teacher. Based on his surviving works and opinions, certain tendencies in Abu Yusuf's reasoning have been determined, such as his tendency to logically follow the implications of a proposition to an absurd conclusion (Reductio ad absurdum) and his use of rather caustic language in his attacks on opponents' positions and in defense of his own. Abu Yusuf is also noted for the frequency in which he changed positions on various issues, which has been suggested is a result of his experience as a judge. Abu Yusuf's greatest legacy is in affirming and advancing the Hanafi legal school as the predominant source of legal thought in the Islamic empire and providing a legal framework for defining and restricting caliphal authority in regard to fiscal policy.

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