Abraham Ibn Daud - Theology

Theology

As to the doctrine of God, Abraham ibn Daud, like Aristotle and his Arabic interpreters, proceeding from the principle of motion, and basing his argument upon the proof of the impossibility of a regressus in infinitum, arrives at the conception of a First Cause of all motion, or of a Prime Mover, who Himself, as First Cause, can not have any other cause of motion above Him, and must, therefore, be thought of as motionless. The Prime Mover is God. But this proof of the existence of God leaves still open two important questions relating to the truth of our knowledge of God: one concerning the incorporeality, and the other respecting the unity of God.

As to the incorporeality of God, it follows logically from the notion of infinity which belongs to the First Cause of motion that no corporeal thing can be infinite itself; nor can infinite force be attributed to it. But the Prime Mover is infinite; for, since He Himself is without motion, His force also remains unaffected by the motion of change and transformation. Therefore the Prime Mover—that is, God—can not be corporeal (ib. p. 47; German trans., p. 60).

But as a being of necessary existence, God must also be absolutely simple and single; inasmuch as the conception of a plurality in His essence would, at the same time, nullify the notion of the necessity of His existence. For the consolidation of this plurality into a unity must have been effected by another being different from itself; hence the existence of this plural being would be no more necessary, that is, determined by its own essence, but would be dependent upon that other being which brought about the unification (ib. p. 49; German trans., p. 63).

From the notion of absolute unity results the conception of the uniqueness of God; for if two beings of this kind could exist, the unity of God would be nullified, since to one, at least, of the units a special character must be attributed so as to distinguish it from the other (ib.). With the doctrine of the unity of God is connected the doctrine of the divine attributes, which is preceded in Abraham ibn Daud's system by the doctrine of the negative attributes, already accepted by Bahya ibn Paquda ("Ḥobot ha-Lebabot," i. 10) and by Judah ha-Levi (Kuzari, ii. 2) from the older Arabic theology. According to Ibn Daud, only negative attributes, in the strict and proper sense, can be imputed to God; so that, whatever multiplicity of these negative attributes may be ascribed to Him, no multiplicity in the essence of God can result. Certainly this is equivalent to a renunciation of a positive conception of the Divine Being; for negative statements may suffice to prevent erroneous ideas, but a positive knowledge can never be obtained through them alone (ib. p. 5; German trans., p. 65). Indeed, our whole knowledge of God is limited to two certainties, (1) that He exists and (2) that His essence is incomprehensible (ib. p. 56; German trans., p. 71). In addition to the negative attributes, only relative attributes can be predicated of God; for even these latter, how many soever may be assumed, since they do not apply to the essence of God but only to His relation to the world, produce no modification in the notion of the unity of the Divine Being (ib. p. 54; German trans., p. 69).

From the speculative doctrines of faith, the truth of which can be proved only by reasoning, are to be distinguished the historical dogmas whose authenticity is based principally upon divine revelation, or, to speak more exactly, upon the historical tradition of such a revelation (ib. p. 69; German trans., p. 87). The tradition concerning an event that is reported to have taken place publicly before a great body of men, which originated, so to say, under the control of public opinion, without having been disputed by contemporaries, and has descended with an uninterrupted continuity, possesses an argumentativeness which can not be controverted even by the professional logician (ib. pp. 78, 81; German trans., pp. 98, 103). The trustworthiness of historical tradition forms a presumption in favor of the truth of prophecy. In the true sense of the word, according to the axioms established above for the reliability of historical tradition, there can be only assertion of real prophecy when the divine revelations apply to important public matters; while those revelations which pertain to less important matters, or even to the personal affairs of a single individual, can not be classed under this head (ib. p. 71; German trans., p. 89). Thus, as ibn Daud remarks, perhaps with a reference to the miracles attributed to Jesus, the authenticity of the Torah would be in a sorry plight if, instead of being based on miracles of real historic certainty, such as those of Moses, it were supported merely by miracles of such private character as the resurrections effected by Elijah and Elisha (ib. p. 80; German trans., p. 101).