1996 Mount Everest Disaster - Analysis

Analysis

The disaster was partially caused by the sheer number of climbers (34 on that day) attempting to ascend, causing bottlenecks at the Hillary Step and delaying many climbers, most of whom summitted after the usual 2:00 pm turnaround time.

Jon Krakauer has suggested that the use of bottled oxygen and commercial guides, who would personally accompany and take care of all pathmaking, equipment, and important decisions, allowed otherwise unqualified climbers to attempt to summit, leading to dangerous situations and more deaths. In addition, he wrote that the competition between Hall and Fischer's guiding companies may have led to Hall's decision not to turn back on May 10 after the pre-decided time for summiting of 2:00 pm; Krakauer also acknowledges that his own presence as a journalist for an important magazine for mountaineers may have added pressure to guide clients to the summit despite growing dangers. He proposed banning bottled oxygen except for emergency cases, arguing that this would both decrease the growing pollution on Everest—many bottles have accumulated on its slopes—and keep marginally qualified climbers off the mountain. He does point out, however, that climbing Everest has always been a highly dangerous expedition even before guided tours, with one fatality per four climbers attaining the summit; and that many of the poor decisions made on May 10 were under the conditions of lack of sleep and food for two or more days (due to the effects of entering the death zone above 8,000 m/26,000 ft), and constant hypoxia, and hence cannot be so easily judged by the general population, who have no experience of such circumstances.

In May 2004, Kent Moore, a physicist, and John L. Semple, a surgeon, both researchers from the University of Toronto, told New Scientist magazine that an analysis of weather conditions on May 11 suggested that freak weather caused oxygen levels to plunge by around 14%.

Fifteen years after the disaster, mountaineer Graham Ratcliffe MBE - who was on the South Col on 10 May 1996 - revealed new information, discovered after five years of research. His book A Day to Die For created new debate among mountaineering magazines and readers around the world. Ratcliffe, the first UK climber to ascend Everest from both north and south routes, began his investigation because of doubts that the weather he experienced on Everest matched reports of an unexpected storm. He traced witnesses who confirmed that a storm had been forecast - and that weather forecasts had in fact been supplied to teams on the mountain. Mystery remains as to why these were not revealed for 15 years.

Krakauer also elaborated on the statistical curiosities of fatality rates on Everest and how 1996 was "business as usual". The record number of 12 fatalities in the spring climbing season that year was only 3 percent of the 398 climbers who had ascended above Base Camp—slightly below the historical average of 3.3 percent at that time. Additionally, 12 climbers had died that season and 84 had reached the summit. This is a ratio of 1 in 7—significantly less than the historical average prior to 1996 of 1 in 4. Since then the fatality rates on Everest have dropped considerably. At the time however, because of the increased number of climbers that year compared to the years prior, 1996 was statistically and paradoxically a safer than average year.