1964 South Vietnamese Coup - Final Preparations

Final Preparations

On January 28, Khanh flew from Hue to Saigon dressed in civilian clothes on a commercial airliner. He covered for his ruse by claiming that he was travelling with United States military adviser Colonel Jasper Wilson and stating that he had come for a dental appointment. This came after Duc had arrived in I Corps earlier in the day with a message from the other plotters that Khanh was to be in Saigon to lead the coup on the day after. What Khanh had actually done was to send Wilson to Saigon earlier in the day to check with the embassy and confirm that Washington did support the coup.

Through Wilson, Khanh told Lodge that he possessed documents proving that Don, Kim and Xuan were about to stage a coup and neutralize South Vietnam. He asserted that their planning involved talks with France. Khanh claimed that pre-emption was needed because if the plot was not stopped immediately crushed, it was a realistic chance of success as a "neutralist platform might strike responsive chord among junior officers." Wilson then phoned Khanh at 15:00 to confirm that Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and the embassy did not object, using a predetermined codeword to convey the endorsement to Khanh.

It was later revealed that Harkins had reported in a cable that Wilson had seen him around 15:00 on behalf of Khanh to determine whether Washington would support a "counter-coup" against those who "planned to seize control and immediately announce a position of neutralization". Harkins stated that he ordered Wilson to report to Lodge. Harkins then reported that he was undertaking "a field trip", believed to be an attempt to lobby Saigon-based forces to join the coup. Harkins was later reported to have said in response to Khanh’s asking whether he objected to a coup, "No, I think you are a very fine general." Afterwards, when asked why he had not tipped off the junta, Harkins said that the ruling officers "weren't getting along anyway, so maybe it was a change for the better. I thought it was."

Khanh flew in to Saigon after Wilson's confirmation, and stayed at the house of a friend and waited for the coup, which was scheduled the coup for 04:00 January 30. According to the plan, Khiem's forces in Saigon would surround the homes of the sleeping junta members while Khanh and a paratrooper unit would occupy the Joint General Staff headquarters near Tan Son Nhut Air Base. Thi followed Khanh to the capital on the same day, and the plotters met in obscure places around town.

At this time, there was one major obstacle, the armored units in the capital and its outskirts. The plotters needed help from Colonel Duong Hieu Nghia, one of the leading Dai Viet officers and temporary head of the Capital Armored Command, who was key to the coup's success. A friend and appointee of Minh, Nghia caused difficulties by failing to respond to Thieu's order that all armor be moved north out of Saigon to Thieu's 5th Division headquarters at Bien Hoa, a satellite city on the northeastern edge of the capital. A CIA cable reported that Nghia was aware that the movements were part of a coup against Minh and told Thieu that he would not deploy out of the capital and declared his support for Minh. This caught the plotters off guard, and as Harkins left on his "fieldtrip" at the same time, Kahin conjectured that he had actually gone to lobby Nghia to support the coup or at least partially back it by agreeing to help depose Minh's confidants Don, Dinh, Kim and Xuan. However, it was then reported that Nghia had agreed to support Thieu, who had apparently then gained the control of both the armored and marine elements in Saigon. He also gained the cooperation of Lieutenant Colonel Ly Tong Ba, the commander of the 6th Armored Squadron and Brigadier General Lam Van Phat, the Catholic and Diem-loyalist commander of the 7th Division, which along with the Thieu's 5th Division was part of Khiem's III Corps. Harkins returned from his expedition on the same day and met Lodge, who told him of Khanh's more recent meeting with Wilson. Less than two hours before the coup took place, in the middle of the night, Lodge told Harkins of the time that the coup would begin and the location of the coup command post.